Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-94-016
Tuesday
25 January 1994

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Finance Minister Explains Economic Program

AU2401105194 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 20 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Finance Minister Piro Dishnica: "The Introduction of Foreign Capital—an Important Aspect of Reviving the Economy"]

[Text] For Albania and its totally centralized economy, the emergence from the autarkic system was accompanied by very severe economic upheavals and disruptions. The admission and recognition of the extremely complicated effects of the crisis that started in the middle of the 1970's, the efforts to ensure the survival of an additional 60,000 mouths to feed each year, and administrative efforts to implement "new economic mechanisms" further exacerbated economic difficulties and brought them to the surface. The wages paid under conditions of very low production levels and the granting of some limited freedoms to state enterprises increased imports and caused a significant increase in the budget deficit (15 percent of the gross domestic product in 1990 and 25 percent in 1991). Albania's involvement in currency transactions also led to the creation of a foreign debt of $500 million, adding to the country's isolation by cutting it off from the world's financial institutions. After 1991, all means of obtaining foreign credit were in practice closed. When the democratic government came to power in April 1992, it immediately undertook a comprehensive program guided by the policy of moving to a market economy. In implementing this program, the government used all its intellectual energies to stabilize all the necessary macroeconomic indicators with its privatization and its legal recognition of new allies in economic life: the struggle against inflation, the control of the budget deficit, and the establishment of a tax system based on the market economy. To enforce this program, considerable help was secured from abroad in many different ways, from the European Community and the "Stand-By" agreement with the IMF, whose success made possible in July 1993 the signing of an agreement in support of the medium-term economic reform program, as well as a World Bank loan. Besides this help, many other states also gave free help with food, development plans, and technical assistance. Italy, Greece, the United States, Germany, Turkey, and the other G-24 countries carried the main burden of this. At first, the government concentrated on its policy of gradual macroeconomic stabilization and of establishing control of the main financial indicators as the sole way of promoting economic growth. Now that the main part of the program has been implemented, visible progress is evident in reaching its principal objectives. The severe fall in production has been halted, mainly reflecting the significant response of agriculture to price reforms and privatization. Spiraling inflation has been reversed and the government's budget deficit has been significantly reduced from 40 percent of the gross domestic product at the start of the economic stabilization program to less than 10 percent in the first half of 1993. This is the result of the enforcement of strict discipline in expenditure, which shows that the process of reducing the budget deficit is continuing, despite constant demands for expenditure and to create and sustain a social welfare network for those most affected by the transition period. In greater detail, expenditure has been made in several main directions:

1. The application of a social policy through an institutional network and a range of economic and social mechanisms, such as unemployment benefit, widening the basis of welfare assistance, and increasing pay and pensions in education and health.

2. Increasing budget expenditure for investments, including a fund of 4 billion leks for the restructuring and support of enterprises.

3. Price subsidies for a range of staple goods of household consumption.

At the same time, monetary policy has been conducted in accordance with the objectives of the general anti-inflation program, the balance of payments, and development. The level of inflation is now considered to be within the limits of the program. From March this year, it has fluctuated around an average of 0.5 percent a month, with the exception of July, when an increase arose from the change in bread and flour prices, and September when there was a relative rise because of the administrative increase of some controlled prices. The rate of money circulation rose from 1.7 in 1992 to 2.1 in 1993. The reestablishment of control over the principal financial indicators led to the stabilization of the lek, which, after its fall in 1992 to 130 leks to the dollar, rose gradually to 85 leks to the dollar in August 1992. Since then, the lek has declined gradually and is now stabilized at 99 leks to one U.S. dollar.

The private sector's share of bank credit has grown from 12 percent in December 1992 to 30 percent. Nevertheless, this is a relatively small proportion because of the institutional shortcomings of the banks and the private sector credit network.

Significant advances have been made in the enforcement of pricing policy and the reduction of budget subsidies. Wholesale and retail prices have in general been freed. Nevertheless, control is being maintained over 25 items, such as wheat, bread, and certain non food-items, such as water, electricity, bus transportation, and schoolbooks. Although the prices for these latter items have risen several times, they still do not cover costs. The policy of price rises aims to remove the obstacles to increasing the production of goods that are currently imported. A visible result of this policy has been the reduction of price subsidies from 3.3 percent of the gross domestic product in 1993 to 2.2 percent in 1992.

In agriculture, the government's attention has concentrated on privatizating and restructuring the state farms, completing the reform of the prices of agricultural products, repairing the rural infrastructure, and privatizating the distribution and processing enterprises. The World Rank and other donors have closely collaborated in this

reform. The priorities have been to privatize and restructure the state farms and to increase the prices of agricultural inputs approximately to the level of the equivalent imports. I wish to emphasize here that the measures to transform the Agricultural Development Bank into a new kind of body entirely subject to the Bank Law are of particular importance for the role this bank will play in supporting the restructuring of agriculture.

Many enterprises remain in a difficult situation in an industry dominated by state enterprises. Many of them are closed or operating at below full productive capacity, incurring major losses in almost all sectors. Lack of financial discipline, failure to adapt to the market economy, and budget restrictions led to an accumulation of debts between enterprises. The life expectancy of several large sectors of Albanian industry is uncertain without deep and painful restructuring and an influx of foreign investment. For this reason, the government created the Enterprise Restructuring Agency, which has direct responsibility for about 30 key enterprises that present the most serious problems, and of whom the majority are loss-making. The goal of this agency is to restructure these enterprises, enabling decisions to be made concerning their future within one or two years, with the aim of turning them into effective enterprises, later privatizing them, liquidating them, or selling their assets.

Within financial constraints, the government's program supports the infrastructure, on the basis of a general assessment that the larger part of Albania's public infrastructure will not suffice to develop a modern economy or encourage investments in various branches of the economy. Although the transportation system has been judged to be adequately extensive, it falls far short of the necessary quality standards and has deteriorated to a degree that it hampers economic development. One of the government's priorities is to repair the main roads and to extend roads in mountainous areas. One positive indication of the fast development of the transportation sector is the private sector's domination of inter- urban and international passenger and freight traffic.

Albania's telecommunication infrastructure is extremely limited. As part of a master plan, it is forecast that a $30-million program financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria will be carried out, making it possible to restructure this sector. It is planned to obtain resources to quickly introduce modern telecommunications systems as a necessary precondition for attracting investors and tourists.

There have been significant improvements in construction, both in the towns and the countryside, mainly carried out by private investors. In order to cover the shortage of housing and to improve the existing housing stock, the government has aimed to increase the role of the private sector and to reduce costs. The law as approved has been implemented, leading to the fast privatization of the housing stock. In order to encourage private housing construction, the rents of recently constructed dwellings have been deregulated. Work has resumed to complete half-finished apartments, and 1,452 of these apartments have been completed and handed over. During this period, investments to the tune of 713 million leks have been made. Private investors have constructed 8,401 dwellings amd 24,090 business premises in the countryside, and many others are under way.

The privatization program has aimed to encourage private initiative in two main directions: the creation of private enterprise in all sectors of the economy, without restriction, and the privatization of state property.

In the second field, besides the priority privatization of the retail sector enterprises, handicrafts, road transportation, construction, the food industry, and light industry, it was planned that enterprises and plants in the industrial sector (mainiy small- scale enterprises and production lines) would also be privatized by the end of 1993. In the course of this program, 25,432 privatization deals have now been concluded, covering 9,000 retail stores, 4,500 service premises, 4,000 deals in transportation, 5,000 in agriculture, and 2,800 in other sectors. More than 100,000 people are now employed in the private sector.

The Privatization Law has been revised to accelerate the process of privatization within the strategic framework. The authorities directly involved in privatization have been reorganized, and an incentive fiscal policy has been adopted. The laws on the bankruptcy of enterprises and on the restitution and compensation of property are expected to exert a positive influence in this direction. Despite the objective difficulties that are emerging, every effort is being made to implement the compensation policy through compulsory orders and to create opportunities for those benefiting to take part in the privatization process.

Suitable legislation for a market economy is being passed quickly. Parliament has approved a law on retail firms, a law on the Albanian bank, a bankruptcy law, an accountancy law, labor legislation, and a very liberal foreign investment law that facilitates the registration procedure and, most importantly, consistently refers disputes to international law. The tax and customs laws have been entirely reformulated in accordance with the principles of the market economy. The increase of investments through the introduction of foreign capital is one of the most important paths toward economic revival. Despite the problems that have arisen, interest among foreign firms and investors to come to Albania is visibly growing. Estimates show that firms with an initial capital of $50 million, and contracted capital of $100 million, have signed contracts and begun work. Different firms making a total investment of $70 million are also expected to begin work on the basis of contracts that have been concluded.

The government is making increasing efforts to create an attractive climate for foreign investors. Foreign investors are not subject to capital controls and are free to transfer their profits. Tax-free status for four years is also offered to all investors in the productive sector, with extensions of this period for firms that reinvest and those who invest in tourism. Moreover, investors will benefit from liberal customs concessions for those articles that will be used for investment purposes. Foreigners may now lease land for 99 years at a very favorable rate and may also buy this land

for certain projects. The imminent approval of the civil code will permit private land ownership and the rights stemming from this ownership will give fresh encouragement for foreign investors to come to Albania.

Alliance Leaders Comment on Shkoder Killing

AU2501073094 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 18 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Martin Leka on a Democratic Alliance news conference held in Tirana on 17 January: "Albania Cannot Become Palermo"]

[Text] At 1300 on 17 January the Democratic Alliance [AD] held a news conference in one of the halls of the Palace of Congresses. Blendi Fevziu opened the news conference and read a press communique from the party presidency.

The communique stated that the murder of Gjovalin Cekini on 14 January marked the tragic culmination of the state's campaign to obstruct by any means the party's political activity. Gjovalin Cekini was a participant in the first anticommunist demonstrations in Albania.

The murder of this AD activist was political, the communique continued, describing the murder and citing evidence relating to it.

One of the culprits in the murder, Selami Cela, emerged from a Mercedes without license plates a few minutes before the end of the Shkoder meeting and spoke to a person who was in the car of Ali Kazazi, the Shkoder Democratic Party [PD] chairman.

A second person involved in the murder was one of the many PD provocateurs in the hall where the AD's meeting took place. Gjovalin Cekini was one of the leading activists of the AD during the meeting, helping to defuse the tensions caused by the PD provocateurs. Selami Cela was foremost among the provocateurs facing the people who emerged from the meeting and shouted "Long live Sali Berisha: There is only the PD in Shkoder."

Gjovalin Cekini and his brother Pal tried to prevent Selami Cela from using his weapon.

The communique went on to state that this murder marked an extreme escalation of the war on the AD and was motivated by the fact that some state officials and members of the ruling party have embarked on the road of crime to fulfill and protect their political and economic interests. For this purpose, they are organizing themselves with the help of Mafia-style structures and activities involving high level officials of the Albanian state, members of the National Intelligence Service, local government officials, professional criminals, traffickers in oil and weapons, violators of the UN embargo against the former Yugoslavia, and members of the Privatization Board or those who have profited or expect to profit illegally from the board. All these control and have taken hostage Shkoder's political and economic life, joined in a criminal association.

As for the statement of the Ministry of Public Order broadcast on Albanian Television yesterday, the communique declared that this statement associated itself with the crime and made political judgments that are in flagrant contravention of the status of a depoliticized television station. This statement differed from that issued earlier by stressing the word "citizen" instead of the word "murderer" used before.

The communique called on the PD, the government, and the president to identify and condemn the culprits fairly and fast, and to identify, isolate, and condemn the mafia-style criminal elements, so that crime and violence may not become a characteristic of the first opposition party in Albania, which rose up against crime and violence.

In conclusion, the communique stated that the AD appeals to the governments of European countries and the United States, the Council of Europe, the CSCE, and the Helsinki Community, asking them to use their authority to intervene to ensure that the tragic murder in Shkoder should not become a precedent for a state of violence and terror.

Messrs. Neritan Ceka and Arben Imami then replied to the questions of the journalists present.

The questions mainly concerned the recent incident in Shkoder, but there were also others off the subject, to which the speakers did not reply.

Asked by KOHA JONE about the recent incident's similarity to the events of 2 April [1991] in Shkoder, Neritan Ceka replied that these two events bore a similarity. This shows the similarity between the regimes, he said, evident in the statement of the Public Order Ministry and its collaboration with the procurator. He went on to say that there are further similarities, because both events made use of armed irregulars [bashibozuko] because the politicians threw stones and then covered their tracks, and because the Public Order Ministry officials and those of the Procurator's Office have learned nothing from the fate of their colleagues of 2 April. There are similarities, because both events have their origins in hatred, with the difference that in the first case this hatred was ideological and in the second economic. Both cases involve a collaboration between the politics and crime. Only a dictatorship can be built on the basis of a mafia and of crime. If the Albanians live with this kind of collaboration for two years, there will then be no elections.

One question was what will the AD's strategy be if the Public Order Ministry persists in the same standpoint. Ceka replied that we only have one strategy, which is democracy.

Answering a question from RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE's journalist, who said that this event could not favor the PD, Mr. Imami replied that he was not sure to whose favor it went, but it is the third occasion in Shkoder on which there has been an attempt to sow terror. The first was the incident with the Socialists; the second involved Azem Hajdari and the New Political Initiative, and the third was this case involving ourselves, which ended with a tragic murder. He stressed that it was the same group attempting to sow terror. In every district, we have encountered PD members who have turned on us with such methods. Imami went on to mention an incident in Durres, in which a person's two trucks had been held by the customs, and the PD's people had asked this person to go to the AD's meeting and shout against the AD, so that his trucks would be released. You, Mr. Paloka, Imami continued, contributed your piece in yesterday's article in which you said that one of the murderers was in the meeting hall. I can add that they later met together in the cafe of the main hotel. Asked if the incident was connected with the embargo, Imami said that the AD was not the first to denounce the embargo, and we are not talking about 30-40 liters, about about a pipe linking the two banks of the Buna and a truck with a big "Marshallah" plate that plies round Shkoder. We accuse people who are vested with power, perhaps with connections to the very summit of power, of breaking the embargo.

In connection with the pro-Serb declaration cited by the Public Order Ministry statement, Imami stated that this was an utter lie. The AD went to Shkoder to start the political new year on 14 January, the anniversary of the first anticommunist demonstration in Albania, a large number of whose participants are now AD members. Gjovalin Cekini was one of the participants in this demonstration, and one of the missionaries of the Catholic church and of religious belief. We went to Shkoder in order to put forward our ideas and our program. We were asked, "Why did you go to Belgrade?" We explained our platform and standpoint on this matter, our standpoint on Kosova, etc. As for the statement that we have neither killed Serbs, nor have they killed us, this is simply a lie perpetrated by the police authorities. Imami underlined that RILINDJA of 16 January on page 11 states that the AD is putting its political views on the market, and he continued, "The fact is that the Serbs and the Albanians have killed and murdered each other, but have not wiped each other out; thus it is normal to start a dialogue." In other words, our statement in Shkoder was quite the opposite to what was alleged by RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and the Public Order Ministry statement. I also possess a recorded cassette of this, Imami concluded in reply to this question.

Neritan Ceka, asked if the AD discerned anybody responsible for this incident, replied that this question should be put to Sali Berisha, president of the Republic, who had warned the socialists in connection with the earlier incident in Shkoder with the words "What did the Socialists want in Shkoder?" The president would have done well to have asked "What do the Motionists [mocioniste, parliamentary group that founded the AD] want in Shkoder?" before this putsch in Shkoder was organized.

Among the many replies given by Messrs. Ceka and Imami, we would single out the answer concerning the meeting of the AD deputies with the general director of the republic's police and the leading police officers of Shkoder, who told the deputies that they were "concerned about extinguishing religious conflict in Shkoder," a strange statement to emerge from a new conference given by AD leaders. The AD leaders said that the motive behind the Public Order Ministry's statements was to confuse the public. We would also single out Imami's statement that he had told the spokesman of this ministry to look for and find former Sigurimi collaborators from the head of state downwards.

In connection with the AD's demands for cooperation with the PD, Ceka said among other things: Return the money of Arsidi and Zhulali to the Albanian State Bank; denounce the Islamic pact and Albania's adherence to it; and seriously fight against corruption and political crime.

In reply to a somewhat obscure question from an ATA journalist, Ceka replied, "We are merely pleased that ATA takes an interest in the AD. So much nonsense is talked about it...."

In conclusion, the chairman of the news conference gave the floor to Neritan Ceka, who said, "I will tell you something. The AD is not made up of men who are frightened." Let me say, and let people realize clearly, that "Albania cannot become Palermo, and there is no turning back." That is all I have to say.

We emphasize that the news conference aroused great interest and passed without incident, in order to scotch rumors circulating yesterday about alleged incidents during the news conference. At the news conference, an AD member, a participant in the Shkoder meeting and one of the organizers of the first anticommunist demonstration, published in the conference hall the names of Gjovalin Cekini's murderers, including that of Selami Cela, who has often been mentioned recently in Shkoder, as well as in Public Order Ministry statements.

Macedonian Diplomat Views Independence

AU2101205694 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Jan 94 p 3

[Interview with Stojan Rumenovski, leader of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Macedonia in Sofia, by Mariyana Boyadzhieva; place and date not given: "Bulgaria's Recognition of Macedonia Was Welcomed With Esteem and Gratitude"]

[Excerpts] [Boyadzhieva] Two years ago, Bulgaria was the first to recognize the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. How has this fact contributed to the development of bilateral relations?

[Rumenovski] For the past two years, Bulgarian-Macedonian relations have been developing positively. Bulgaria's recognition of the Republic of Macedonia was welcomed with esteem and gratitude both at the highest level and by all the Macedonian people, as well as by all the remaining citizens of the republic, as you know well. Furthermore, this act acted as a stimulus for developing mutual contacts in specific fields. [passage omitted]

[Boyadzhieva] Has the position that Greece has adopted regarding the name of the Republic of Macedonia hampered the young state from establishing itself internationally?

[Rumenovski] The Republic of Macedonia is an equal member of the world community and the United Nations. It has received international recognition from over 50 countries, most of which have established diplomatic relations. These include all the members of the European Union, China, Russia, Japan, and others. Macedonia does not threaten any of its neighbors. Our independence and international recognition are not a cause of instability. Quite the contrary, we have demonstrated—and the world is convinced of it—that an independent Macedonia is a factor that prevents the war from spreading. The Macedonian state is a key factor for Balkan peace and stability.

If I have to give a specific answer, it is certainly true that Greece's position delayed the process of recognizing Macedonia but failed to halt it. This is an irreversible process because Macedonia is established as an entity in international law.

[Boyadzhieva] Bulgarian-Macedonian relations are developing well at the personal level. What is hindering them from developing better at the interstate level? The position adopted by official representatives in Skopje is strange, to put it mildly, especially regarding the two countries' histories.

[Rumenovski] I would not completely agree with this assessment. On the contrary, official political contacts are developing well, as I mentioned previously. With no other neighboring country is the Republic of Macedonia developing such lively political contacts. Many ministries maintain regular contacts between one another. Our Foreign Ministries hold periodical consultations. However, the political will for cooperation is not being sufficiently well expressed in concrete terms. The reason for this is that the legal basis for our relations has not yet been developed. Many bilateral agreements are in the process of preparation. We have already concluded an agreement on economic and commercial cooperation, a consular agreements, and so on.

As far as history is concerned, it is possible that the picture seems like this from Sofia's viewpoint. This is understandable, because many things have been inherited from the old system and prejudices have accumulated over the years. Both sides have a lot of work to do on overcoming these viewpoints, and this will be achieved by developing cooperation in all spheres, thus strengthening the trust between the two countries. Similarly, it is normal to expect that the contradictions and differences of view in this direction will be overcome.

[Boyadzhieva] Bulgaria has opened its embassy in Skopje. Will Skopje respond by making a similar gesture, and how will this contribute to bilateral contacts?

[Rumenovski] The establishment of diplomatic relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria was reciprocal. On 21 December 1993, the two Foreign Ministries exchanged notes on raising the consulates general in Skopje and Sofia to the level of embassies. The raising of our interstate relations to the highest level will certainly speed up and enrich both the development of Macedonian-Bulgarian relations and understanding and friendship between our two peoples. In the very near future, Macedonia will seek approval for its first ambassador in Sofia. This will open a new page in the relations between the two countries and peoples.

Commentary on 'Failures' in Macedonia Relations

AU2201182694 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 15 Jan 94 p 1

[Mikhail Neykov commentary: "So What"]

[Text] Two years have passed since we recognized the independence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Tracing the road toward its consolidation in the international arena, we assumed the risk of incurring the hostility of close and remote countries. So what?

Unfortunately, there was no turning point in relations between our two countries. The lies and insinuations that were insistently spread by Skopje and Belgrade in the past 50 years did not stop. The various obstacles and barbed wire still exist along the border. Our citizens continue to feel like "white crows" in Skopje, Bitola, and Ohrid. Almost nothing has been done to establish direct railroad communications or modernize the roads between the two countries. The possibilities of intensifying trade-economic cooperation and implementing initiatives related to scientific and cultural exchanges were not fully utilized, and God knows there are such possibilities.

It is true that joint efforts are needed to melt the ice that has accumulated in the last 50 years. It also is true that the authorities in Skopje are still loyal to the ideas of Titoism and fear everything Bulgarian, just like a vampire fears the daylight. One cannot expect from them any initiatives or total cooperation. However, what did our representatives

do during those 730 days? Did they trace any new paths that could now be widened? They did nothing, or almost nothing at best.

Instead, we saw President Zhelev smiling with satisfaction when he was handed a translation of his "fascism" in some "language." We were puzzled when we saw how easily Prime Minister Berov swallowed his unease with the presence of a translator during his talks in Skopje. We also had to suffer the blunder with the commodity credit, which was promised ostensibly by [former Deputy Prime Minister] Neycho Neev. We blushed when President Kiro Gligorov confused us with his speech in the UN General Assembly, with not a single representative Bulgarian institution expressing its indignation. No one paid any attention to the report of the "Helsinki Watch" on the violations of the minorities' rights in Macedonia. That report mentioned the Albanian, Turkish, Gypsy, Serbian, Muslim, and many other minorities. Only the Bulgarians remained unmentioned. They simply do not exist, they disappeared. The Miladinov brothers, Dame Gruev, Gotse Delchev, and tens of thousands of revival figures would have blushed and burned with shame if they could assume that we will keep silent when it is broadly claimed that there are no Bulgarian elements in Vardar Macedonia.

It is high time to take a clear and categorical stand on those failures. Dirty hands or incompetent people could mar both the past and the present. What we probably need is a brief document of approximately 2,000 words, which, after holding a referendum and receiving the general support of the public, could once and for all clarify to the world our position on the Macedonian issue.

No one in our country lives in a dream world, nor is anyone striving to change political borders. We only want to protect our glorious past from someone's dirty hands.

Daily Warns About 'Would-Be Fuhrers,' Gelemenov

AU2101193894 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Jan 94 p 6

[Konstantin Subchev commentary: "Calculated Chaos"]

[Text] The people of Stara Zagora woke up to find the town besmirched with fascist symbols and calls to settle accounts with ethnic minorities. These slogans are nothing new, but today they arouse particular alarm.

All the actions of the executive and legislative authorities make increasing numbers of people doubt whether the present political system is capable of dealing with the lawlessness, inflation, and unemployment.

Politicians and journalists have described this social chaos as "the Weimar syndrome."

The comparison with Germany in the 1920's is reinforced by the appearance of would-be fuhrers, each with his own program for solving every problem.

At the moment the greatest dreamer with hopes of becoming the savior of the nation is Father Gelemenov. The mass media have contributed to his popularity to no small extent, and this arouses certain suspicions.

With all his eccentricities, the good father is unable to gather enough supporters and funds to fulfill his threats. However, his statements, widely publicized in the newspapers, create a mood in society that may bring it to accept a really "strong hand," not only without resistance, but even with feelings of relief. There are enough examples of this in Bulgarian and world history.

Accordingly, in this case the militant priest is playing the role of a John the Baptist, who clears the way for the person who is to come and "baptize" the nation, and to baptize it "not only with the Holy Spirit, but also with fire," as the Gospels state.

As everyone knows, a flame does not only burn tinder, but consumes everything else as well.

Increased 'Isolation' of DPS Noted

AU2101202394 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 15-16 Jan 94 p 6

[Commentary by Konstantin Subchev: "'Far From Splendid' Isolation"]

[Text] The concept of "Splendid Isolation," which exists in British history, refers to the time when the island always succeeded in staying out of Europe's military-political alliances and joining the victors at a convenient moment.

Over the last four years, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] has successfully followed this tactic of maneuvering, avoiding every hazard in its way. Those hazards included the attacks of the nationalists, the Constitutional Court doubts, the suspicion of the parliamentary forces, and the mass media's critical attitude. Throughout that period, the DPS succeeded in fulfilling, to a large extent, its election promises without directly committing itself to the executive power.

The situation in the DPS now is far from rosy. Its commitment within the framework of the governmental mandate did not bring anything positive to its voters and evoked the inevitable struggle in the leadership, where mutual accusations of cooperating with the State Security and participating in the "revival process" were exchanged.

The meeting between Zhan Videnov and Filip Dimitrov created a sense of insecurity in the DPS on anything related to raising the electoral threshold, something that could leave the party outside the parliament.

Finally, the DPS also dissociated itself from President Zhelev. Otherwise, it would not have been so concerned with the creation of the notorious Military Office at the Presidency, and Ahmed Dogan would not have missed the opportunity to participate in the festive dinner in honor of Ms. Albright.

The DPS' isolation is increasing, and it could hardly be called a "Splendid Isolation."

Prime Minister Klaus Responds to Criticism

AU2501151094 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

["Exclusive" article by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus: "Revolutionary Dogmatism and the Nontriviality of Practical Politics"]

[Text] Recently some members of the cabinet and I myself have been reproached for assuaging our rhetoric and even a certain withdrawal from our originally defined positions. I have the feeling that the people who argue this way base their criticism on a misunderstanding of the first post-November period and a somewhat superficial observation of the present stage of the historical regeneration of our country, and since this is a serious matter, it merits a few words of explanation.

If we take as the first example the economic basis of our transformation program, the intensity with which I fought in the spring of 1990 for the price liberalization, balanced budget, macroeconomic stability, and particularly privatization is being compared with my present alleged leniency in the matter of the rent and transport tariffs regulation, in the disputes over supplementing the state budget from the National Property Fund or the postponement of the beginning of the second wave of coupon privatization. These critics here note a contradiction that is beyond my comprehension.

My original fight for freedom of enterprise and the abolition of all forms of state interventionism is being compared with my present endeavors to regulate the super-fast development in wages. Another sin!

Today, the fundamentally negative stand I assumed against the gradualist project of the economic reform (represented particularly by V. Komarek, M. Zeman, and F. Vlasak) is contrasted with my own gradualism in the matters of the state administration reform, for instance, or the education reform. Again, an alleged inconsistency!

While in the past I have been often described as the chief engineer of the "shock therapy," a Friedmanite, and an ultra-right character, I am being attacked today, from the side of the so-called authentic right wing, for my—according to them—unwarranted social regards and hesitance in adopting more severe and risky economic and social solutions. Almost a state paternalism!

My merciless criticism of the so-called third way is presently being compared with my endeavors to explain to the Western governments where their real mistake lies. My consistently negative stand towards the communist past is being contrasted with my willingness to cooperate with the widest possible circle of able people who are ready to act. My calls for freedom of the press and speech are being contrasted with my alleged efforts to place the radio and television under the direct control of the government. I could go on like this for quite a while longer.

First of all, I must point out that I listen to these criticisms very carefully, and that from each of them I am trying to reach some conclusions for myself. Nevertheless, I believe that they are based on false assumptions, which are the idea of the inconsistency of my present and former views, on the one hand, and the idea of the equivalence of the tasks of January 1990 and those of January 1994, on the other hand!

The ensuing misunderstanding (I cannot rid myself of this so frequently reminded and caricatured word of mine) troubles me nonetheless, and therefore I keep trying to explain the reasons for it in the press, at political talks, or at meetings with citizens. Even in this brief text, I would like to make at least two general comments on this.

The first problem that causes complications is the communication between a politician and the public by means of the deceptive transmission mechanism of media. Politics is—among other things—the art of the correct usage of the words, which are ordinarily at the politician's disposal only in the degenerate form of slogans, signs, certain cliches, and especially dangerous simplifications. A politician unfortunately does not have the opportunity to express his ideas and views in extensive essays or even novels, or rather, if he does, he does not do so as a politician. The situation forces him to express himself in a condensed manner, therefore necessarily imprecisely, and—let us not be afraid to admit it—often dogmatically and schematically. I will give a small example. If the Czech, or more correctly "Prague" economic school (which is a daring exaggeration) had at least a small comparative advantage in anything at all in the present economy, it would be, for instance, in its understanding that the term "central planning" represents only a hypothetic model concept, and that nothing like that has actually existed in the real socialism of the past decades. Although—as opposed to standard economics—I am well aware of this, in the every-day political abbreviation, I defend the free market against central planning because I cannot do anything else. (Nevertheless, it could have been noticed that I avoid the cheap condemnation of various institutions and mechanisms of the past, and instead always try for a positive program).

I would like to emphasize that I feel awkward using such and similar thought abridgements and slogans and, in particular, I am concerned that I could discombobulate someone and elicit false expectations of a similar brevity of the practical solutions. I am afraid that some of our somewhat tardy revolutionaries of the turn of the years 1993/1994 would, still today, like to see changes that would be just as fast in actual life as they are in the words used. Some of these people perceive our temporarily lower rate of unemployment as a betrayal of the ideas of Milton Friedman, others compare the present "oppression" of businessmen with the period of the government of Klement Gottwald, yet others interpret the search for a complex transformation of the budget-funded and subsidized organizations into non-profit organizations

and the optimum relations between sponsors and the tax system as a denial of the foundations of the civic society and Michael Novak's concept of "mediating structures." Of course, this is completely false, but all that remains is to be careful with the condensed slogans, and keep explaining patiently what is concealed behind them.

The other important element is that our society and the economy—without us realizing this sufficiently well because of the tremendous speed of the changes—are no longer reminiscent of almost anything of the political and economic structures of the period immediately after the November. The problems that we are dealing with today are miles from the problems of spring 1990, i.e. from the period immediately after the fall of communism.

Some of us insist on underestimating this factor. They forget the difference between demolishing and building, the difference between the spectacular pivotal measures (there are several of them) and the assiduous every-day work, and the disparity of the fast system-forming steps and the slow post-transformation tasks, they forget the one-dimensional character of the political, social, and economic reality then, and the vigor and wealth of life today, they forget the greater possibilities for adopting rapid measures then, and the complex system of our political life now. Moreover, our oversensitivity to the excesses of the past very logically puts our government in a much weaker position than that of an ordinary Western European government. All this fundamentally affects, and to a great degree complicates, our life today, but we have to take it as a given circumstance. This also applies to our critics.

It is my deepest conviction that the practical politics of the present are completely consistent with the stands we have proclaimed incessantly since November 1989. The dissatisfaction and impatience of some of us is not a result of the errors of the present, but rather stem from a misunderstanding of the essence of the present system and, for that matter, also of the past one.

Zieleniec Discusses 'Partnership,' NATO

AU2501104694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 21 Jan 94 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Martin Danes; place and date not given: "We Will Be a Member of NATO in a Few Years"]

[Text] In the wake of President Clinton's visit to Prague, we interviewed Foreign Minister Zieleniec on the Partnership for Peace and the Czech Republic's future security situation.

[Danes] What is your assessment, a week later, of the visit to Prague by the U.S. President and of the Partnership for Peace plan?

[Zieleniec] I think that President Clinton's visit was important not only for us and for designing the new security architecture in Europe but, from a certain point of view, also for the United States. The very fact that the visit took place and that President Clinton chose Prague as one of the places to hold talks during his first visit to Europe was also significant for us. This is recognition of what we are doing, recognition of the success of our reforms, and is a manifestation of the friendly relations between the United States and our country.

In my opinion, this visit was also important for the United States. U.S. foreign policy has been seeking a specific form ever since President Clinton came into office. It has often had to endure harsh accusations from European politicians and media that the country is again seeking isolation, that it is becoming wrapped up in itself, or that it is reorienting itself toward Asia. At the same time, it is obvious that, from the security point of view, Europe was, is, and will be for a long time a key continent. Clinton's European visit, the way it was planned, and its results prove that Europe remains a central feature of U.S. security policy.

The visit was also important for us because it acted as a major stimulus in the debate on expanding the Western security system. It demonstrated that the anxiety about the West's reluctance and inability to gradually fill the security vacuum in Central Europe was unfounded. The Partnership for Peace plan originally offered, in principle, only joint exercises and the possibility of other military activities with NATO. What the NATO summit in Brussels finally approved and President Clinton outlined in Prague is much more. The plan now contains a serious offer of political cooperation.

[Danes] What does this offer of political cooperation consist of?

[Zieleniec] The approved document contains a relatively detailed definition of the political values on which Partnership for Peace is based. This is important because the North Atlantic Alliance defends the West European, if you like, Western Christian, system of values—freedom, democracy... So as not to use any high-flown words, it defends our way of life. This specification is also the basis for future differentiation between the individual partner states. If the Partnership for Peace is established explicitly on this value basis, a basis that also serves as a criterion for the success of the bilateral agreements, I have no doubt that it will lead to our country's membership in the Alliance. Since the beginning, Czech diplomacy has been striving actively to ensure that, for these practical reasons, the plan attained a substantial political dimension. The fact that this has happened is undoubtedly a result of this endeavor.

Moreover, during his visit to Prague, President Clinton put forward other specific projects in support of the new European democracies, projects that should intensify the ties between our republic, the other Central European countries, and NATO countries. It is apparent from all of this that the Partnership offer is not a decoy or a blind alley but is a real step forward—a step that, at the same

time, also relates to Russia and presents alternatives in the event of unfavorable security developments in our region.

[Danes] Did you get, for instance, an indirect promise from the U.S. President of involvement in our security, and were specific dates mentioned in this regard?

[Zieleniec] No promise of specific involvement was made, and no dates were mentioned, but I do not think this is what is important here. The visit by the U.S. President and the talks as a whole mean that they are taking us into consideration. Moreover, President Clinton said very decidedly that the security of the Czech Republic is important for the security of the United States.

I would also like to refer to the reverse aspect of this issue, an aspect that is often overlooked. If we feel like a future NATO member—and I believe justifiably so—we should think about it within the scope of its future efficiency. That is, one day the Alliance will also guarantee our state's security. I admit, therefore, that, in reply to a question of whether NATO should be opened up immediately to all the countries of East Europe, I personally do not come up with the answer as easily as some Czech journalists. Perhaps it would be worth thinking about this, about whether it would be better to wait a while—as far as our entry into NATO is concerned, of course—with the aim of maintaining the Western alliance's efficiency. The immediate incorporation of inconstant Eastern states, many of which do not yet have a deep-rooted system of Western values and are economically and politically unstable, into the Alliance could seriously impair its defensive strength. No such considerations are ever published in the Czech press.

[Danes] How distant does the prospect of signing a bilateral treaty with NATO within the framework of Partnership for Peace seem to you? When, thereafter, will we join NATO?

[Zieleniec] I generally estimate our entry into NATO within a few years; the entire process, however, is to a considerable extent associated with the development of the security situation in Europe and throughout Eurasia. As far as signing our bilateral agreement with NATO within the framework of Partnership for Peace is concerned, I think this is a matter of a few months. The government has to discuss the NATO offer formally and submit its proposal to the NATO secretary general. The Alliance will then submit its proposal on the basis of this. These two proposals create the bedrock for treaty-based relations. The government must also consider how much money we want to spend on this.

[Danes] According to the decision made in Brussels, the size of the financial investment each country is willing to make in the Partnership for Peace will also influence the extent of its cooperation with NATO. How much money will our government earmark for this plan?

[Zieleniec] I will intentionally not answer the question of "how much." The issue does not only involve money as such. Our participation in the plan must reflect our willingness to take part in the activities of the NATO countries and our coresponsibility for defending the region of democracy. This is an important matter (it is possible to declare anything verbally), but we recognize real will according to the willingness to make sacrifices. On a specific level, this means conducting an analysis of the costs and comparing them with the possibilities. Inasmuch as we have not used up our military budget, we will draw the money, first and foremost, from it, and perhaps we will also add something from other sources.

[Danes] Prague has shown a more enthusiastic attitude toward the Partnership for Peace than the other Visegrad Four countries. Is this because our prospects for exchanging the partnership for membership are greater than the prospects of the other countries?

[Zieleniec] I want to speak not about prospects but, rather, about a real estimate of the situation. Of all of the Visegrad countries, we had the most unequivocal policy toward NATO. The aim of joining the North Atlantic Alliance was expressed, if not immediately, then relatively soon after the revolution—as an element of the state's political orientation, of course. It would be hard to find such unequivocalness in the policy of other countries. In some places, I observe a chopping and changing—from rejecting NATO and seeking salvation in the CSCE to joining NATO immediately.

[Danes] I cannot completely agree with you on the issue of the unequivocalness of our stance. Your predecessor, Mr. Dienstbier, preferred, in contrast to you, a concept for creating a single Eurasian security zone and organizations like the CSCE....

[Zieleniec] Our stance has been stable since 1992, at least, when we won the election. Of course, the Civic Democratic Party had an unequivocal stance on this issue before the elections; it has had one virtually since its establishment.

The Czech approach of steady orientation toward NATO was eventually accepted as the most practical one during the Prague summit. This does not mean that I could not imagine a better option, for example, with a specific entry date and so on. Of course, when there is more than one partner, not all of them can ever be 100-percent satisfied with the result. If I gauge development in the Partnership for Peace plan from the point of view of the potential for influencing its final shape, we have achieved above-average results.

[Danes] A meeting of the Visegrad countries' defense ministers, which our Minister Baudys refused to attend, was held in Warsaw just before the summit. Polish representatives, in particular President Walesa, then accused the Czech Government, which was rejecting military cooperation within the framework of the Four, of shortsightedness and egoism. The West still views these countries as a single geopolitical zone. Are you not

concerned that the West may interpret our veto on military and political coordination within the Four as a destabilizing factor in the region?

[Zieleniec] We have to confront absolutely this evaluation of the situation. I would consider the "all or nothing" stance of some countries to be more dangerous for stability in the region. It is difficult for more than two partners to agree upon the "all or nothing" principle. For multilateral cooperation, it is always essential to define the areas in which all of the participants will agree.

The Prague summit, however, also contributed to clarifying this issue. It is necessary to deal with security cooperation on a bilateral basis—that is, each country with the North Atlantic Alliance separately—on account of the very nature of this cooperation and to prevent the creation of alternative blocs. The Czech Republic cannot accept such a risk.

[Danes] Are you aware of any attempts to create an alternative military bloc?

[Zieleniec] The way things are in policy, if you take the first step, logic will push everything forward. The example of Visegrad is typical of this. You can see how much passion our decision to exempt one aspect from it is arousing in such a loose association—in fact, a symbolic association. I agree that integration with the North Atlantic Alliance is in our common interest, but, if we look farther to the East, our ties and those of Poland with the East are not the same. This is because our geopolitical situation is different.

I think that we would be making a bad job of defending our interests if our security interests were exactly the same as the security interests of all of the countries in the region. Incidentally, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher left his colleagues from the Visegrad countries in no doubt about the importance of regional cooperation, but cooperation in the security sphere must consist, first and foremost, of bilateral ties between these states and NATO. This point of view was also expressed in the speech delivered in Prague by President Clinton. It is essential within the framework of Visegrad to execute regional cooperation by carrying out specific deeds, for example, in the trade and economic spheres, and not just hold ostentatious summit meetings at which the perfidy of the West is cursed.

This is not our policy. We are transforming our state so that it becomes a typical element of the West. This cannot be replaced by the "banging on the doors" kind of behavior. It is not true that, if four fists bang on NATO's doors together it is more effective than one fist. We are not banging on doors. We are orienting ourselves toward the West definitively and straightforwardly.

Vondra Views Partnership for Peace, NATO

AU2201182594 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 17 Jan 94 p 9

[Interview with Czech First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra by Martin Schmarcz; place and date not given: "Vondra: The Czech Republic Could Become a NATO Member in the Nineties"]

[Text] After the meeting of the Visegrad Four countries with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Prague, various opinions have emerged about the Partnership for Peace project. MLADA FRONTA DNES asked First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra how he views the Partnership for Peace project and what the Czech Republic's attitude toward NATO is.

[Schmarcz] The Czech Republic, unlike Poland, for example, has very positively accepted the Partnership for Peace project since the very beginning. Why?

[Vondra] I would correct this statement slightly. We tried to influence the form of the Partnership for Peace project before it was on paper. We wanted the document to be far-reaching regarding the prospects of our membership in the Alliance and to allow maximum differentiation. This is what we have strived for in the past eight months—that is, since the idea was born. However, it seemed meaningless to us to sound the alarm when it was fairly clear how the Partnership for Peace would look. Moreover, it seems to us that the project represents the maximum of what the 16 NATO countries are able to agree upon. I believe this gives us sufficient room that we can use to push for our interests.

[Schmarcz] Did the Czech Republic consider getting something more from the Alliance after the elections in Russia, as Poland did?

[Vondra] I believe that this would not be a realistic policy. In the final stage, we will want to joint the Washington Treaty on NATO. For this, we will need the approval of the Czech Parliament and of the 16 parliaments of the member countries. If we raise unrealistic demands at this moment, some people might propose alternatives. We must realize that the Czech Republic has no other alternative.

[Schmarcz] Can you tell us what the NATO reaction would be if the situation in Russia became worse?

[Vondra] It is a positive fact about the Partnership for Peace program that it opens the possibility of real military consultations in case of a threat. If the United States has clearly said, through its President, that the Czech Republic's security is in U.S. vital interests, then it means that, to a large extent, they are anticipating our membership. We were assured during the talks that, if the situation deteriorated, particularly in the East, the Alliance's open policy would have to be replaced by "the policy of containment after the Cold War." This time, we would be on the same side as democracy and the free market.

[Schmarcz] When will the Czech Republic join NATO, in your view?

[Vondra] If there is political will on both sides, this does not have to take much time. In any case, I would like this country to be firmly anchored to the territory on which the values of Western civilization prevail and where it is possible to protect them.

[Schmarcz] Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev said that Russia could join NATO, but there are other possibilities. What are they?

[Vondra] Minister Kozyrev spoke very clearly about Russian endeavors at the most recent CSCE meeting: They want to radicalize [radikalizovat] the institutions of which Russia is a member, be it the CSCE or the Council for North Atlantic Cooperation. The reason is simple: These bodies do not allow the Alliance to come closer to the individual countries, and Russian clout is greater there, of course.

[Schmarcz] How do you view Russia's role in the Partnership for Peace project—in view of the rejective declarations on NATO's expansion?

[Vondra] Russia will try to push for its interests, of course, particularly in its immediate neighborhood, as has been declared not only by the dark forces of Russian politics but also by Russian democrats. To a certain extent, this is quite legitimate, and I believe that our task is to keep the Czech state where it has belonged during all of its existence. I believe that we are not in the sphere of direct Russian interest, but that does not mean that we should not cooperate with Russia, in the commercial sphere, for instance.

Former Official Cited on Media 'Manipulation'

AU2501092994 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 22 Jan 94 p 2

["RP"-signed report: "Basta Confirmed That After November, the Secret Services Fabricated Material Against Troublesome Journalists"]

[Text] In an interview on Friday [21 January] with RUDE PRAVO, the former deputy chairman of the Federal Security Information Service [FIS] and chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] Security Commission, J. Basta, indirectly confirmed the suspicion that the post-November secret service fabricated compromising material against journalists critical of current officials.

"Using the same methods, you are arriving at the same conclusions as I have. Of course, I cannot speak about things that are still considered state secrets." This is how Basta answered a RUDE PRAVO question in connection with the RUDE PRAVO article of 15 January that discloses suspicion that the secret service fabricated compromising material against troublesome journalists that it could use in case of need.

"I would be only too happy if some matters could be completely clarified. This can apply, for instance, to a certain Security Information Service [BIS] or Interior Ministry's disposition toward such sensitive issues as the freedom of the press," Basta said at the CSSD news conference on Friday. Afterward, he told RUDE PRAVO that he was thinking of cases of press and public opinion manipulation by the Interior Ministry.

According to him, other methods were also used to influence journalists. As Basta said, "obviously, all means available to the secret service were used to this purpose. This includes, for instance, the establishment of an opinion-making instrument, which can be established by simply providing exclusive information regardless of the degree of their secrecy to certain journalists. If we glance through RESPEKT magazine since 1990, and possibly some other papers of a similar orientation, precisely from the point of view of the publishing of classified information, we will find at least four infractions or even crimes against the law on state secrets," Basta told RUDE PRAVO. According to him, the matter of the list of alleged State Security [StB] agents in the Syndicate of Journalists also merits an investigation. The list was prepared by the FIS in 1992, but the thing is, nobody was interested in how the diskette with the list of Syndicate members got into the hands of the FIS agents, Basta observed.

Army, NATO Agree To Hold Joint Exercises

LD2401144394 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] General Henning von Ondarza, commander in chief of NATO Allied Forces for Central Europe, today discussed in Prague concrete cooperation in the context of the Partnership for Peace plan. Gen. von Ondarza and Major General Jiri Nekvasil, chief of the General Staff of the Czech Army, agreed, among other things, that three Czech officers would attend a working meeting in NATO's Brussels Headquarters at the beginning of February.

On the basis of bilateral agreements, an exercise of a Czech and Dutch motorized platoons will take place in our country as early as in March, and an exercise of a Czech and a French motorized platoon will take place at the end of May and the beginning of June.

Defense Minister Comments on Lithuania Visit

LD1901164294 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Czech Defense Minister Antonin Baudys has ended his three-day official visit to Lithuania and returned to Prague. Martin Dorazin reports from his news conference:

[Dorazin] At a news conference shortly after arriving at the old Ruzyne airport, Minister Baudys summed up the contents of his visit to Lithuania. During his talks with

the Lithuanian president, the parliament speaker, and the minister of defense, Baudys focused on briefing them on the Partnership for Peace project. He also briefed the Lithuanian representatives on our attitude toward European security. Let us recall that a desire to cooperate with NATO was voiced by representatives of the Baltic countries in the so-called letter from three presidents to NATO.

The Czech minister of defense then got acquainted with the situation in the Lithuanian Army, which is undergoing the process of building and has problems similar to those of the Czech Army.

Minister Baudys confirmed that the Czech Republic will grant Czech surplus equipment to the Lithuanian Army as a gift.

Antonin Baudys expressed mild surprise at the atmosphere full of trust that accompanied his visit to Lithuania and said that, while we have survived socialism, Lithuania survived the USSR.

No Agreement Yet on Arms

AU2101144694 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 20 Jan 94 p 2

[CTK report: "Baudys Has Offered Lithuania Some of the Czech Army's Weapons Free of Charge"]

[Text] Prague—Although the Czech Army is ready to donate submachine guns, tanks, and radio-navigation equipment to the Lithuanian Army, a specific agreement on supplies of the Czech Army's surplus armaments to Lithuania has not been concluded. This statement was made yesterday by Defense Minister Antonin Baudys following his return from a visit to Lithuania.

According to Baudys, the reason is that the Lithuanian Army does not have a clear concept for its structure or for its armament program.

Baudys said that the Lithuanian Army, in essence, has no equipment; however, a much better atmosphere prevails in it than in the Czech Army. According to him, this is because Lithuania feels more than the Czech Republic that it has to guarantee its own security, first and foremost, alone.

Funding for Secret Service, Interior Ministry

AU2101114594 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 12 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Kohout: "A Comparison Between Financial Means for the Interior Ministry and the Secret Service"]

[Text] The Security Information Service [BIS] budget is secret and so is the number of its staff. According to the sources of a CESKY DENIK reporter, the 1994 BIS budget was set at 1.2 billion korunas [Kc].

The planned staff of the secret service is approximately 1,300 employees, but it has not been at full capacity for some time now. Approximately 800 employees work in BIS. A rough approximation gives us Kc1.5 million per one BIS employee. This amount includes the cost of social and health insurance, investments, wages, and so forth.

The Interior Ministry budget was approved this year in the total amount of Kc17.7 billion. After expenditures related to the Interior Ministry's Civilian Administrative Department, Fire Brigade Main Administration, and investment expenditures of the ministry are deducted, there are Kc16.2 billion left for the entire Security Department. This amount covers the needs of the police and other security divisions—the Foreign Relations and Information Office (intelligence), for instance. The employee total of all security divisions, including police, comes to approximately 56,000. A rough calculation gives approximately Kc289,000 per policeman and year. This budget also includes social and health insurance premiums, subsidies for subsidized organizations and civic associations, operational costs (maintenance, repairs, rent, power, etc.). A rough comparison shows that the Security Information Service has approximately five times greater funds (per worker) at its disposal than security divisions under the Interior Ministry umbrella.

[Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech on 13 January on page 3 carries Dusan Sramek article "Devaty Explains Secret Service Budget." It states: "Stanislav Devaty, BIS acting director, yesterday described the CESKY DENIK report, according to which reporter Lubor Kohout obtained information revealing the amount of the BIS budget as Kc1.2 billion, as complete disinformation."]

Klaus on Friction Between Government, ODS

AU2501102694 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 22 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Martin Danes; place and date not given: "The Ministry of Culture Is a Relic of the Past"]

[Text] In the regular interview for our paper, the prime minister spoke mostly on the topic of the relations between the leadership and the deputies' club of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS].

[Danes] Do you share the feeling of Foreign Minister Zieleniec that the visit by U.S. President Clinton to Prague and the Partnership for Peace plan will bear fruit in the form of the expeditious membership of the Czech Republic in NATO?

[Klaus] I really cannot say anything new on this topic: At present, no one is offering us NATO membership. It would be a delusion to dream that we could convince the NATO-member states to change their attitude by intense pressure or just by ardent rhetoric. Partnership for Peace is a workable way outm and there certainly is NATO membership at the end of this road.

[Danes] What is a better alternative for you, no Ministry of Culture or a Ministry of Culture headed by Pavel Tigrid?

[Klaus] Of course, today's option, and at least until the elections, is a Ministry of Culture headed by a good person. On the long-term basis, I believe that the Ministry of Culture is a bit of a relic of the past, and I really believe that we could do without it.

[Danes] The departure of Deputy Josef Jezek from the ODS and the way it was commented on by Deputy Chairman Jiri Vlach are only additional signs that relations between the ODS and its deputies' club are not in the best shape. What are you planning to do to improve them?

[Klaus] I do not believe that these relations are not in good shape or that they are in worse shape than standard relations between the executive and the legislative powers anywhere in the world. It is perfectly logical, and it must be so, that the government and parliament are struggling with each other over their powers. It is a normal phenomenon.

This week, I spent an entire day in the ODS Deputies' Club, and I have not noticed any adverse relations there. It is not true, and I believe that it is all being unnecessarily blown out of proportion.

The problem lies elsewhere. It is, as is common, that there are individuals with a very definite one-dimensional orientation who contemplate their problem from morning till night. They link many other things to settling or not settling this problem according to their ideas. This was the case with the "cartographer," a technocratic expert on the constitutional arrangement, Deputy Jezek, and it is the case with this or that deputy, who is mainly concerned with the settlement of the issue of the military zones here or there. I could go on listing certain monothematic affairs that frustrate individuals. I believe that this does not involve any fundamental conflict in the overall philosophy, ideology, or political stand, and therefore I do not see any reason to make it more dramatic than it is.

[Zieleniec] I think that we would be making a bad job of defending our interests if our security interests were exactly the same as the security interests of all of the countries in the region. Incidentally, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher left his colleagues from the Visegrad countries in no doubt about the importance of regional cooperation, but cooperation in the security sphere must consist, first and foremost, of bilateral ties between these states and NATO. This point of view was also expressed in the speech delivered in Prague by President Clinton. It is essential within the framework of Visegrad to execute regional cooperation by carrying out specific deeds, for example, in the trade and economic spheres, and not just hold ostentatious summit meetings at which the perfidy of the West is cursed.

This is not our policy. We are transforming our state so that it becomes a typical element of the West. This cannot be replaced by the "banging on the doors" kind of behavior. It is not true that if four fists bang on NATO's doors together it is more effective than one fist. We are not banging on doors; we are orienting ourselves toward the West definitively and straightforwardly.

Kovac Seeks Assistance From UNIDO Official

LD2101153894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Following his meeting with Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik and the subsequent signing of the memorandum on cooperation between UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] and Slovakia, UNIDO Director General Mauricius de Maria y Campos was received this morning by Slovak President Michal Kovac. Jozef Rebo has the details:

[Rebo] [passage omitted] Slovakia is ready for bilaterally advantageous cooperation with UNIDO. Regarding specific matters, the president said that Slovakia would welcome concrete assistance from UNIDO, in particular in economic transformation. Privatization is also closely linked to economic transformation. We also expect assistance in putting into effect environmental projects and new technologies.

On the other hand, Slovakia wants to contribute to UNIDO work and get involved in assistance to Third World countries. We are able to join mining and metallurgy projects, projects in the construction industry, engineering, timber-processing, chemical, and electrotechnical industries.

In reply, Mr. Campos said that UNIDO respected Slovakia's efforts in the sphere of industrial development and that UNIDO wished to continue to support our efforts. [passage omitted] Mr. Campos then met representatives of Slovak business circles, and, in the afternoon, he will visit Slovak Power Engineering Works in Tlmace.

Kovac Defends Idea of Coalition Government

AU2401101094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 19 Jan 94 p 2

[Open letter from Slovak President Michal Kovac: "A Broader Coalition—The Path to Stability"]

[Text] We carried in NARODNA OBRODA the full text of an open letter from HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] officials and deputies to the president of the Slovak Republic dated 8 January 1994. It raised objections to the idea expressed by the president in his New Year address of forming a broader coalition. Yesterday, a reply was delivered to our editorial office. We are publishing the letter in full:

"I have read your open letter of 8 January 1994. I respect your right to an opinion and to criticize the president's public addresses. Nevertheless, I believe that it would have been decent if you had asked me to answer your questions in a personal letter to me, rather than in an open one, or if you had invited me to a private meeting so that I could explain any misunderstanding before you took a public stand.

It is not customary for a president to answer open letters in the press. I have decided to take this course because of the particular significance of the problems that you presented in your letter. In the meantime, other voices have been raised on the same problems, accusing me of wanting to cast doubts on the position and work of the government. This is utter nonsense and the product of unfounded mistrust, which I must categorically reject.

You yourselves ask several questions that seem to blend into a single one: You ask me whether other parliamentary parties in addition to the HZDS and the SNS [Slovak National Party]—that is, parties that do not have any credit for the establishment of the Slovak Republic—should be represented in the coalition. Let me recount several basic facts.

The results of the elections in June 1992 facilitated the formation of a government purely on the basis of the program of the HZDS and the SNS. This government had the support in the Slovak parliament not only of 74 HZDS deputies but also of 15 SNS deputies. Because of this and also because of the votes of some Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] deputies, it was possible for the Slovak parliament to adopt the Declaration of Sovereignty of Slovakia and to approve the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

We did, however, need votes from other parties in the Federal Assembly to pass the Law on the Demise of the Federation and other related laws. We succeeded, as is well known, in obtaining votes from the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] and again from the SDL. Therefore it was possible to terminate the function of the federation by peaceful and constitutional means and start on 1 January 1993 on the road of independent state existence. The demise of the federation ended the first postelection phase, and the emergence of the independent Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993 started the second. In this second postelection phase, during which the silent coalition fell apart and eight deputies left the HZDS club, there are much more difficult and long-term tasks that require, among other things, the consolidation of all forces and their participation in carrying out historic tasks. There is no point in incessantly recalling who wanted or did not want what prior to the elections and during the first postelection phase. Instead, we must ask who and under what circumstances is ready and willing to participate in building the Slovak statehood and solving vitally important problems. We need to invite partners rather than produce adversaries. Such work requires peace, stability of government, a Slovak Partnership for Peace—that is, a partnership of all the significant political forces and trust and support from abroad. This could be achieved if the government were constantly supported by 80-90 deputies. Given the present coalition, we know that consistent support can be expected from 74-76 deputies. It is enough to continue with makeshift government solutions and improvisations that enable it to survive on a month-to-month basis. It is not enough, however, for us to seek in a peaceful atmosphere and with the maximum support of

hundreds of thousands of people the conceptual and profound solutions to the problems of the economy and internal security and to receive sufficient trust and support from abroad.

I appealed in my New Year address for a peaceful and conceptual way and for stability of government, which requires the consistent support of at least 80-90 parliamentary deputies.

In this spirit, I spoke about the need to form a broader coalition government. That is why I am calling for such a government. It is my duty. The responsibility of the HZDS implies the movement's obligation to form such a government. It is the duty of not only the HZDS chairman or the HZDS leadership but of the entire HZDS to do everything in its power in the interest of finding a solution to the vitally important needs of our citizens, to create political stability in the country and accord among political and nonpolitical forces.

Its election victory granted the HZDS a single privilege—namely, the right to form a stable government and guarantee a peaceful atmosphere and the necessary support for its work in parliament and public administration.

Whether we like it or not, the exercising of this privilege puts an end to the differentiation between those who wanted an independent Slovak state and those who did not, those who voted for the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and those who did not, those who vociferously call for early elections and those who oppose them, those who support the government and those who criticize it and incessantly question its acts. According to our democratic Constitution, regardless of whether we are in the government coalition or the opposition, we are all equal, and that applies not only to deputies but to all citizens, regardless of whether they voted for the HZDS, the KDH [Slovak Christian Democratic Movement], the SDL, or Coexistence. To ask for other privileges in addition to this is undemocratic and anticonstitutional.

You ask who is to be in the coalition that I am postulating. Again, I can only give you a general answer, but I know that a coalition can only be formed with the help of those political entities present in parliament. Who will form it depends on whether the HZDS will aim for a broad coalition, with the support of at least 80 deputies, for instance, or a broader coalition, with the support of, say, at least 90 deputies. True, within the broad coalition, the election results would definitely have to be taken into account, both in the composition of the government and in its policy objectives. This would not mean in either instance—and with the parliamentary mechanism it is not even possible—a denial that the HZDS emerged from the elections as the strongest political force. If a broader coalition government is considered, then it is solely because such a situation transpires in parliament as to make it a necessity. While, at the beginning of 1993, it was possible to choose between a noncoalition and a coalition government, today a coalition, and it seems a broader coalition, government is unavoidable.

I again repeat that personal dislikes of people at the head of individual parties and movements must not stand in the way of the formation of a stable and operational government.

I would be glad if these words could convince you that, with my idea of the need for a broad coalition in my New Year address, I did not in the least intend to cast any doubts on the government. This is precisely the reason that I refer to a broader coalition government. I see in it a guarantee of a greater and more stable support in parliament and in the public. Only such a government can guarantee internal stability, raise the international credibility of our state, and contribute to the creation of a calm, human, and working atmosphere in our country. We can achieve this only if all of us consistently put the interests of Slovakia and its citizens above the interests of individual people, parties and movements, and other groups.

Meciar Friday Interview on Current Issues

LD2101214994 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Peter Toman in Bratislava on 21 January—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Toman] This week our country has been extraordinarily rich in visits of representatives of important international institutions. Experts from the Council of Europe, Miguel Martinez, the chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as well as Max van der Stoel, of the High Commission of the Conference for European Security and Co-operation [CSCE], were especially interested in changes in the territorial division of Slovakia as well as our reform of state administration and self-administration. Did more fundamental proposals come out of these meetings, Prime Minister, by which the government would correct its existing intentions in this area?

[Meciar] All three visits were important and each of them was different. The talks on territorial division, which were held at an expert level, in effect examined different variants of the proposals we had submitted and the objections that were envisioned to be raised by Hungarian political parties in the Council of Europe. I can say that the Slovak Government course was solidly based, and we shall submit all legislative proposals to the National Council by 30 June so that they can be approved. The territory of Slovakia will be divided on the basis as required by the administration of the given territory and not on an ethnical principle.

The second visit, which was connected with the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe, Mr. Martinez, was significant in that we discussed rather global problems, global relations in Europe, and Slovakia came out very well, even more than very well out of that assessment. If the citizens could have heard what was said, this would have simply confused our criticics and those people who are engaged in propaganda against us, and they would have to creep back into their corner. Moreover, those talks provided an impetus for Slovakia to act in the pursuit of such relations in its own name and become substantially more active than before so that its voice could be heard substatially more loudly. It should cease to be the Czech Republic's twin and come out with its own independent proposals and initiative, which Europe needs. It also needs ideas from us because they are important and our perception of things, although different in some things, cannot be said to be bad because of this.

The visit of the Commissioner van der Stoel in essense reacted to the ongoing process of a two-year inspection both in Hungary and Slovakia regarding the minorities issues. One proposal that came out of it was that a consultative body should be set up at which minorities issues would be continually discussed. A proposal on collective rights, however, did not come out of it. The talks did not touch on that subject.

Therefore, all three visits were special in their own way. Each of them was positive in relation to Slovakia both in content and importance. [passage omitted]

[Toman] Already deliberations of parliamentary committees have shown that discussion about two amendment bills on big privatization, the government one and the one put forward by a group of deputies for the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], will be among the most interesting points on the agenda of a January session of the Slovak parliament. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] There is a diametrical difference between the SDL bill and the government bill. We do not intend to support the SDL bill becuase it is based on unrealistic assumptions. Above all, it is based on the assumption that there is strong capital market and a lot of money here—and the opposite is true. The National Bank of Slovakia does not intend to release those 20 billion [presumably Slovak korunas] spoken about in the context of privatization in 1994.

Furthermore, the SDL bill does not take into account the fact that our territory is nationally mixed. Various nationalities live here, and various economic interests exist here. There is no longer any need to hide the fact that, according to the figures on privatization as of 30 June 1993, in the nationally mixed areas more than 50 percent of privatized assets were acquired by the Hungarian capital—almost the entire retail sphere, food industry, wholesale distribution. This is not good, and it can have political hidden meaning, too. This is why it is necessary to have also other entities present there.

If the system changes proposed by the SDL are carried out, this would result in two undesirable facts. First, privatization assets would be accumulated in hands of a narrow circle of people. Second, the present reorganization would be destroyed and we would need to begin anew. [passage omitted]

A compromise is possible because the SDL bill includes some rational elements of a technical nature that are acceptable to us. However, we got stuck in the last moment as the SDL demands the split of privatization minister post from the post of president of the Fund of National Property. [passage omitted]

[Toman] In this context, opposition officials like to list your present posts, ranging from the chairman of the presidium of the Fund of National Property to privatization minister and to the post of prime minister of the government. Mr. Prime Minister, is this accumulation of posts inevitable? Isn't an appointment of privatization minister about to be announced?

[Meciar] [passage omitted] The problem is not that I am currently holding the two posts. I am in fact putting things in order there. In substance, as moral and political authority was lacking to reveal the relations about the existence of which we were aware, I have found time to do this tidying up. It is now under way. [passage omitted]

As far as a new privatization minister is concerned, I have known his name for a long time, and an agreement on him was reached several months ago. So far I have not put forward his nomination to the president only because the SDL bill proposes, among other things, to abolish the Privatization Ministry. Once this issue is clarified by a law adopted by the parliament, I will immediately put forward my nomination for privatization minister.

I have never personally accumulated power. I accumulate responsibility, administrative duties, and I serve. It is totally alien to me to perceive my post as the post providing me with power. [passage omitted]

[Toman] A week ago, Interior Ministers Jan Ruml and Jozef Tuchyna announced that their recommendation regarding open questions concerning the Slovak-Czech border would be that the hamlet of (Sidonia) in the village of Horne Srnie become part of the Czech Republic and, on the other hand, the hamlet of U Sabotu in the Moravian village of Javornik nad Velickou become part of the Slovak village Vrbovce. [passage omitted]

[Meciar] As far as border changes are concerned, meetings of ministers are only consultations. I do not think we will manage to conclude the matter by the end of this year because the problem is more complicated inasmuch as it involves also the catchment area of the Morava river. [passage omitted]

A decision on this matter can be made only by the National Council. I would like to confirm once again the pledge I made in the past that not a single square centimeter of the Slovak territory will be given away

without being compensated for by a square centimeter from the Czech side and without an agreement of legislative bodies. The government will stick to this principle, strictly respecting not only the local self-administrative bodies but also other matters. [passage omitted]

'Tense Situation' in Disputed Border Community

AU2401200694 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Jan 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "dah": "Referendum Will Decide in Javornik; Tense Situation at Czech-Slovak Border"]

[Text] Javornik—There is tension and, to a certain extent, a very dangerous situation in the hamlet of "U Sabotu," which is part of the Moravian community of Javornik in Hodonin district, according to a number of local residents. The Javornik Community Council has therefore rejected the recent agreement between the Czech and Slovak interior ministers, under which the "U Sabotu" hamlet and the Javornik railway station (altogether 140 hectares of Czech territory and 37 houses) are to be ceded to the Slovak Republic.

As Javornik Mayor Martin Kruzica told SME, the situation is rather tense, in his opinion. He would not yet want to characterize the situation as dramatic [vyhrocena], although verbal assaults are not a rarity. Their main target are the 20 locals who applied for Czech citizenship, thereby exposing themselves to ridicule from the Slovak side, especially in the local pub. The agreement reached by the interior ministers was based on a petition asking for the territory to be annexed to Slovakia. However, the petition was signed by only 46 of the 126 residents of the hamlet. By means of a different petition, 300 Javornik residents communicated to the Ministry of Interior and border commission the complete reverse position, however.

As Martin Kruzica told us, the Community Council is now studying the possibility and effectiveness of a referendum that would involve all 860 Javornik residents. If everything goes smoothly, the referendum could be held as early as next week. "I expect the outcome to be nearly 50-50, but more than one-half could in fact opt for annexation to Slovakia," the Javornik mayor added.

On the one hand, Martin Kruzica understands the problems of Slovak citizens who commute from the hamlet to Slovakia for work and school. The motives of the protests against surrendering the area to the Slovak Republic are, however, just as serious, in his opinion. Many private plots would find themselves on the territory of another state, which would complicate access for their owners. Overall, the border change would render impossible access to 45 hectares of meadows and 209 hectares of forests. A protest over a possible modification of the border has also been submitted by 150 Czech owners of land from Velka nad Velickou. According to Jiri Psurny, mayor of this community, their protest has been addressed to the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, the Chamber of Deputies, President Vaclav Havel, and government representatives. Other problems that must not be neglected concern timber cutting and harvesting, for which the border would have to be crossed. The question of all kinds of fees and tax conditions would also inevitably arise in this context.

The Czech and Slovak interior ministers will recommend their solution to the governments, but it must be approved by the parliaments of both countries. "We have contacted deputies representing southern Moravia and would like to assert through them our present interests. The issue of small border traffic, in particular, should be resolved at long last. I am seriously worried that otherwise, the verbal clashes might evolve into something we do not want," the mayor of Javornik conceded in his interview for SME. "We have in our community written records that are 200 years old. The borders in these records are virtually identical to the present borders. There is no need to deal with the problem of the border, it is people's problems that require solutions."

Russia To Double Natural Gas Deliveries

AU2001115794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Jan 94 p 2

[Interview with Rem Ivanovich Vyachirev, president of the Russian GAZPROM gas company, by Vladimir Duduc, in Bratislava on 10 January: "Doubling of Deliveries; Preliminary Agreement on Gas Imports From Russia"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Duduc] We know that, while in Bratislava, you discussed natural gas deliveries to Slovakia. What are your conditions?

[Vyachirev] Our talks were concluded with the signing of a protocol that affirms the two sides' interest in advantageous bilateral cooperation. [passage omitted] The Russian Federation is interested in increasing natural gas deliveries to the countries of Western Europe via the Slovak Republic's transit gas pipeline system. Your side, on the other hand, is asking for more gas from Russia. We have agreed that experts of both countries meet in Bratislava or Moscow by the end of the first quarter of this year to specify the amount by which [Slovak] natural gas imports will be increased. According to preliminary agreements, the increase should be in the range of 4-5 billion cubic meters, which is approximately twice the amount the Slovak Republic has been importing thus far.

[Duduc] Have you also come to an agreement on prices?

[Vyachirev] No, we did not discuss prices. Even if we did, I would not reply to your question because it is a commercial secret. I would not tell anyone.

[Duduc] Did you also discuss the modernization of existing gas pipelines or the construction of new ones?

[Vyachirev] We have agreed on a fraternal division of labor. Everyone will do his job on his own territory—Russia on Russian territory and Slovakia on Slovak territory.

Ambassador to Russia Comments

LD2101134894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Much has been said this week about the suspension of Russian oil suppplies to our country. According to the latest reports from Moscow, everything is all right now. Ambassador to Russia Roman Paldan, with whom our permanent correspondent to Moscow talked this morning, has more details.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Smihula] I know that you held intensive talks this morning with the senior staff at relevant ministries and offices. A while ago you spoke on the telephone to (Valeriy Chernayev), president of the Russian company Neftetrans. Ambassador, what is the latest development?

[Paldan] The end result is that oil supplies to Slovakia will be resumed at 1200 hrs today.

[Smihula] Do you mean our time or Moscow time?

[Paldan] Moscow time.

[Smihula] This means then that Russian oil should have begun traveling toward our country when the lunchtime edition of Radiozurnal is on the air.

[Paldan] It is expected that the throughput of 27,000 tonnes in 24 hours will be achieved shortly. This is close to the normal throughput, I would say. Available at the present time are 150,000 tonnes of oil, for which documentation has been issued. Work on further quantities is going on in order to ensure a continuous flow and subsequently also continuous production in Slovnaft [Bratislava-based refinery working on Russian oil]. [passage omitted]

Communications Minister on End of RFE Contract

AU2201181694 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 17 Jan 94 p 4

[Interview with Roman Hofbauer, minister of transport, communications, and public works, by Ivan Vaclavik; place and date not given: "Do We Need Radio Free Europe Until the Elections?"]

[Excerpts] Certain groups find the termination of the Radio Free Europe [RFE] broadcast on the AM band via the Slovak telecommunications transmitter a hard morsel to swallow. We asked Roman Hofbauer, minister of transport, communications, and public works, what led to this decision. [passage omitted]

[Vaclavik] Have some reasons arisen for abrogating the contract before 1995?

[Hofbauer] A lot has changed since 1990. The state guarantees political plurality, democracy, and freedom of expression. A dual broadcast is enshrined in Slovak law. That is something that even Austria and Hungary do not have. The configuration of the RFE broadcast has also fundamentally changed, and this was not approved by the participating partners in the contract.

[Vaclavik] What is the essence of the dual broadcast in Slovakia?

[Hofbauer] It is, among other things, projected in the great demand for private and commercial broadcasts. The wavelengths and broadcast frequencies of each state are very strictly and precisely regulated and coordinated by the so-called Geneva plan. Otherwise, chaos would fill the air. Therefore, each state protects its broadcast possibilities as part of its national wealth. Given these circumstances, it is surprising that Slovakia has not sufficiently covered its own territory by the Slovak radio signal. The chances of possibly receiving Slovak radio abroad, as we hear from our countrymen, are even worse. It is, to a large extent, a result of the Slovak radio transferring its broadcast to FM frequencies, the reception of which is diminished by the varied land surface. A good, statewide reception from our transmitters is possible, particularly on the AM band. On the 1287 kHz frequency, however, you will not receive the broadcast of a Slovak radio station but rather that of RFE.

[Vaclavik] In a recent interview with RFE Director Robert Gilett, a possible reduction of the RFE broadcast was discussed. Nevertheless, the station allegedly maintains the full extent of the broadcast.

[Hofbauer] No, it has substantially reduced the broadcast, which confirms that the political climate in Europe has changed. The original funding of $208 million has been reduced to one-third, and the staff is being reduced just as drastically, allegedly to one-half. [sentence as published] As part of the reduction, the section for broadcasts to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary is closing, while the broadcasts for Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania are allegedly being maintained. The Slovak side cannot view this other than as a certain form of classification of European states, which, with respect to Slovakia, we can only denote as unfortunate. It is also necessary to assess the alleged claim of "maintaining the RFE Slovak broadcast until the early parliamentary elections...." The Slovak Republic Council for Radio and Television Broadcast is a better place to look for comments on the content and structure of the RFE Slovak broadcast. It is well informed regarding the completely biased depiction of Slovakia by people who failed in democratic elections. Of course, there is nothing to prevent Radio Free Europe from broadcasting for Slovakia, as long as it is done outside the Slovak territory and as long as they will finance it.

Jeszenszky Analyzes 'Partnership' Prospects

AU2501104494 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 24 Jan 94 p 6

[Article by Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky: "Partnership for Peace—Slow Return to the West"]

[Text] In the period of the cold war, most Hungarians—including me—saw NATO as the symbol of hope that communism would not prevail in the West and, as a result, we would also one day regain our freedom. For 45 years, NATO has successfully preserved peace and the Euro-Atlantic system of values, and it introduced the spirit of cooperation in a Western Europe torn apart by war.

These achievements should also spread to the eastern part of Europe. Hungary and other Central European countries would like to see guarantees that the changes of 1989-1990 are irreversible and that their return to the western world is taking place in an institutional framework, and not only through momentary, economic and political relations. Given the fact that there are no chances of gaining full membership in the European Union before the end of this decade, NATO is the only organization that can facilitate a rapid and secure implementation of our goals. Today, Central Europe can be compared to some kind of no-man's-land where, in addition to the threat of neo-imperialism, which cannot be totally excluded, economic and environmental security are not guaranteed either. Hungary must join the well-functioning Western structures to encourage foreign investments and an increase in the number of tourists, and to strengthen confidence in Hungary. We are at most halfway through the implementation of these goals.

At the Copenhagen summit held in June 1993, the Council of Europe set out the goal of opening up toward the East. Six Central and Eastern European countries signed partnership treaties with the European Union; two of them, the treaties signed with Hungary and Poland, will come into force as from 1 February 1994, and the ratification of the other treaties is currently under way. A similar decision emerged at the NATO summit in Brussels on 10 January 1994: The "Partnership for Peace" program makes it clear that the countries that are successful in this cooperation could hope for NATO membership. At his meeting with the Visegrad four on 12 January 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton confirmed that the security of Central Europe is also vital for the security of the United States.

I think this view is not completely in harmony with the spirit of the Partnership for Peace program. Although Washington mostly accepted Moscow's position, the decisions made in Brussels and Prague offer more advantageous opportunities for Central Europe than a mere relocation of the former Iron Curtain more to the East. Our region, which was the scene of two world wars, does not want to be a border area or a battle ground again. A partnership relation between NATO and Russia is much more important for us than mere NATO membership for Hungary and having to face an big enemy power. Therefore, it is better to wait, although this also has its risks.

As for the various criticisms regarding the Partnership for Peace plan, this peace partnership does not refer to everyone: While the "self-selection system" awards the pioneers and the good students, it is also an encouragement to those who have fallen behind. The Brussels decision helps both Ukraine and Russia, and we are particularly glad that the recent Russian-U.S.-Ukrainian agreement on nuclear weapons received a new impetus in Hungary on 18 December 1993, when Leonid Kravchuk and Al Gore met here on the occasion of the funeral of the late Hungarian prime minister.

The meeting in Prague strengthened the Visegrad and Central European cooperation, something that has had priority for Hungary since 1990, and the recent U.S position also strengthened this.

The other argument against expanding NATO says that the conflicts between some countries that want to join NATO would weaken the alliance. This excuse is unfounded. Organizations like the national minority chief commissioner of the Council of Europe or the CSCE are capable of coping with this problem, like the tensions deriving from the situation of 3.5 million ethnic Hungarians living on the territory of our neighbors, people who feel that the majority of the population shows hostile feelings toward them and their rights are not guaranteed. Together with the European Union and the Western European Union, NATO will contribute to the development of a more favorable atmosphere, to the solving or at least the easing of these tensions. At the same time, if the behavioral norms prevailing in Western Europe since the end of World War II spread to Central and Eastern Europe and penetrate the political elite, the armed forces, and the youth, the existing tensions might decrease considerably.

We think that the Partnership for Peace program is the way that leads directly to NATO, and we are striving to make use of every opportunity for cooperation, whether political, diplomatic, consultative, military, logistic, or any other opportunity. We admit that full membership must be preceded by a long preparatory process, but we are convinced that we will fulfill the NATO demands in a few years. Our commitment is clear. From this moment, what have become the basic questions of our security policy are when and how.

Jeszenszky on Partnership for Peace, Serbia

LD2401150494 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0540 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by unidentified program announcer; place and date not given; from the "Morning Dialogue" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] From today it is possible to sign the framework agreement of the so-called Partnership

for Peace in Brussels. It is believed in Brussels that the affected countries are in quite a rush. Lithuania, for example, would like to sign the document within days, and its prime minister himself will go to Brussels to sign. Our guest is Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, who, according to reports last weekend, will sign the accord personally. However, last weekend there also appeared rather different assessments about the accord. Increasingly more people believe that this agreement is really a success for Russia and not for the Central European or, if you like, the Visegrad Group of countries.

[Jeszenszky] I do not agree with the view which holds that it is not our success. Last October, when Warren Christopher presented this program to Hungary and the world for the first time, it was much more modest than the current one. It did not contain—or did only very hazily—the promise of NATO membership, whereas now the door is open. For Hungary, NATO membership is not the only possible way of legally joining Western structures but perhaps the fastest and safest one. [passage omitted: benefits, chances of membership]

[Announcer] Has a concrete date been fixed for you to go Brussels and sign the accord?

[Jeszenszky] This is not a horse race. I do not consider it important as to who overtakes whom. In any case, Hungary—which has played quite a significant role in working out the draft—will surely be among the first. I do not mind signing simultaneously with others. [passage omitted] I do not know the concrete date, but I think that the signing will take place within a good couple of weeks.

[Announcer] You visit Belgrade this week. What will you take with you, for, after all, Hungary's relations with Serbia, or to be more precise, rump Yugoslavia are, to put it mildly, not very good. [passage omitted]

[Jeszenszky] [passage omitted] For Hungary, the end of the conflict is very important. [passage omitted] The Danube, as a free waterway, is of vital importance, and then there are the Hungarians in Vojvodina, who are under threat. Really, the aim of this visit is to demonstrate again that our objective—ever since the formation of this government—is to carry out a balanced policy toward all our neighbors, including the Yugoslavs. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Is there a thawing in the Belgrade-Budapest relationship?

[Jeszenszky] I can say that the outbursts which could be described as regular, have ceased—quietened down—in the Belgrade press. These were the most impossible tales: That there are training camps in Hungary; that Hungary, in cooperation with Croatia, is arming the neighbors. [passage omitted] These reports, which were manufactured for domestic consumption, have now ceased.

It is also important that the most innocent victim of the embargo, the civil population—and even within this group, those who have nothing to do with the policy which provoked the embargo, such as the Vojvodina Hungarians, for example—should survive this period. [passage omitted on Hungarian humanitarian aid deliveries]. The first task is to ensure the survival of, and the second task is the achievement of the political recognition of, the Vojvodina Hungarians. We have some hopes in respect of the latter and I would like to investigate this.

[Announcer] What do you mean by political recognition?

[Jeszenszky] Recently, several contacts have taken place between the Democratic Community of the Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] and the Serb leadership. I think that the VMDK does not wish to make use of this difficult situation—i.e., that the Hungarians can tip the scales between the Serbian Socialist Party and the enemy [ellenseg]—either by entering the government or to form a coalition with a very heterogenous opposition which includes, inter alia, extremist radicals. However, in any case, the VMDK's responsible behavior will perhaps slowly achieve certain results and the political plans of the Hungarian population—the various autonomy concepts, i.e., that it is a political factor [szubjektum] whose affairs must be sorted out—have a certain chance of succeeding. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Last week the Slovak Foreign Ministry attacked you for saying in an interview in a Polish newspaper that there is no border question between Hungary and Slovakia. [passage omitted]

[Jeszenszky] I do not think that it was for this sentence that I was attacked—only very bigoted people could attack me for it. However, what I said was very much in line with, e.g., the stand of the Hungarian grand assembly [nagygyueles], the government assembly [kormanyzati assembly] in Komarno [Komarom], too.

This attack is an artificial incitment to hysteria, or serves domestic political purposes. [passage omitted] The long interview contained but a mere half-sentence reference to the fact that certain of our neighbors, Slovakia and Romania, do not fulfil the expectations of the Council of Europe, their own promises. [Slovak] Foreign Minister Moravcik knows very well that this is a fact. The fact that he comments in an elaborate way on my statement shows precisely that Slovakia would like to divert attention to what is taking place there.

[Announcer] In Hungary, several political forces are calling for a referendum to be held regarding Partnership for Peace, since it is such an important issue that it cannot be decided without asking the people. What is your view on this?

[Jeszenszky] I believe no referendum is planned regarding the Partnership for Peace program in its narrow sense. Parliamentary ratification will only become necessary if Hungarian troops were sent abroad or foreigners took part in Hungarian military exercises. If the agreement includes such details then we will

submit it to parliament. Consultation is continuous with the parliamentary parties regarding these issues.

NATO membership is a different matter. [passage omitted] NATO provides absolute security, since it represents a force which can deter small and large aggressor from making an attack. Therefore I believe that the closest possible relationship with NATO is in Hungary's unequivocal interest. I do not believe that a referendum is justified from this point of view. It is also very expensive. [passage omitted]

I believe there will be no need for a referendum after the forthcoming elections, but each party should state clearly before the elections what their stand is regarding NATO. The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] advocates NATO membership, so those who want NATO membership in Hungary should vote for the MDF, and those who are afraid of NATO membership should vote for other parties.

Article Views Consequences of Clinton Tour

AU2301174694 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Jan 94 p 9

[Article by Washington correspondent Oszkar Fuzes: "The United States and Eastern-Central Europe—The Consequences of Clinton's Tour on Hungary and the Region"]

[Text] In accordance with reality, Washington differentiates between individual countries and groups of countries in Eastern Europe. Russia is important from a global policy viewpoint, and the United States regards the success of Russian reforms as the pillars of the new world order. As for the other former Soviet republics, the United States finds it important that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan discard their nuclear weapons and the others stay "clean." If, as it promised, Moscow honors the independence of the new states, it will be able to emerge as a crisis manager, or even a judge with U.S. approval.

Washington is for regional cooperation in the case of both the CIS and Eastern Europe. Despite all the Czech opposition, Washington supports and encourages the Visegrad cooperation as well. Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and even the "immature" Bratislava are treated uniformly and placed in the same drawer of "local affairs" in the big global policy cabinet. Clinton lifted the ban on the purchase of U.S. weapons to all the four countries simultaneously, and Christopher also made it clear that the door leading to NATO can either become wider or narrower for these countries. They must prove their democratic maturity in solving their bilateral conflicts. Clinton specially remarked that violent nationalism and anti-Semitism are unacceptable for the United States. He did not hide the fact that the United States is providing greater political and economic support to the new democratic countries in order to help avoid the renewal of totalitarianism. Talbott added that the United States does not want to be the judge in the conflicts of small countries. Nor will the United States take it upon itself to "put in a good word" for them in Moscow. In case of a possible revival of the Russian threat, something that Christopher definitely regards as only a possible supposition, the Visegrad countries can count on U.S. security policy help " to be defined at the proper time." Perhaps this does not seem to be a big thing—Christopher said—but this is a very serious responsibility on the part of the NATO. It exceeds the mere consultations. If these countries get deeper into the peace partnership, conduct military exercises together with us, and make military plans together, then we will have relations with them in which their security will become very important for us. If someone turns back, we can again drop the security barrier used in the past, although we would definitely not like to draw a separation line in Europe again. The Russian leader who claims that we promised Moscow not to allow anyone into NATO is making a big mistake, Christopher said.

Christopher's deputy Talbott places emphasis on a slightly different thing: "The real integration of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe is a very long process. Just like the Russians, we also fear that Moscow could again become isolated from the outside world. This does not mean that Yeltsin gets a veto right in the possible extension of NATO, but we will definitely take the viewpoints of the Russian reform into consideration," Talbott said.

Behind the Visegrad goup, there are the other Eastern European countries. Most of them have not yet fulfilled the preliminary conditions of the peace partnership. (Civil and parliamentary control over the army is not firm enough, the military budget is not completely public and regulated, unsolved territorial issues might emerge, and the civil democracy is not stable enough). Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Macedonia are in this drawer; in addition, these countries are important for the foreign policy makers in Washington not because of themselves but because of the Yugoslav crisis.

Given certain U.S. global strategic considerations, the same makes Albania slightly special. NATO could get access to an important port at Durres. Besides, Albania is an excellent place for "keeping an eye" on the Balkans. The third exception is the most developed country in the region, namely Slovenia, which, to its misfortune, is still regarded as a former member of Yugoslavia by the the United States and it is not part of the Visegrad group. (In addition, Slovenia could have a border debate with Croatia.)

Small Yugoslavia is last on the list and, together with Bosnia, they are treated in a global policy connection rather than an Eastern European connection. In Brussels, NATO presented three conditions for the Serbs to avoid possible air strikes: 1. The aid convoys must be allowed to enter Srebrenica. 2. The Tuzla airport must be opened. 3. The "strangling" of Sarajevo should end. These are the most clearly formulated conditions, but who would be certain that the threat is more serious this

tir[illegible] Besides, it is questionable whether a Western military intervention is effective at all now that the Serbs have practically won the war.

The United States' real dilemma now is which bad thing to choose. If it accepts the international recognition of most of the violent Serbian territorial gains, the moral and legal basis of the new world order will suffer an almost irremediable damage. In addition, this would lead to a long Muslim guerrilla war, which would reopen the conflicts in Croatia as well. If the United States wants to force the Serbs to come up with serious territorial compromises, then it must send troops to Bosnia and get involved in a serious war. It seems that the slogan in Washington today is "No solution is the best solution," and it continues to hope that the impoverished Serbia would be forced to retreat sooner or later.

In conclusion, we must return to a factor that also received some new color before and during Clinton's trip. The United States has always regarded the situation of national and ethnic minorities as a security factor in words. However, it drew the conclusion that the more quiet the minorities stay, the better. Washington never supported the demand for collective minority rights in any form, mainly territorial autonomy. Now Clinton repeatedly condemned the etnocentric nationalist state and national concept, as well as the disadvantageous discrimination on an ethnic basis, and he also stressed that guaranteeing the democratic rights of national, ethnic, and religious minorities is a global interest and, thus, it is also important for the United States. Vice President Gore and National Security Adviser Lake stressed for the first time that the oppression of national minorities causes nationalism and incites conflicts. Clinton concretely took a stand on behalf of the Russian minorities in the Baltic, and his staff signalled that the United States supports the idea that international institutions and agreements should also guarantee the minority rights.

In the first year of his presidency, Clinton concentrated on U.S. domestic policy, and this will hardly change in the future. However, the concrete balance of his European tour shows that our wider and narrower region, including Hungary, receives a place in shaping the new world order according to weight. It has become clear to a correct and open Hungarian foreign policy free of over or underestimation and a balanced foreign policy in its issues and style that it is worth continuing the Visegrad cooperation and the other subregional cooperation in the benefit of our Western integration, and we must seek an honorable rapprochement with our neighbors. The bad-taste rivalry, the old-style maneuvering between big powers, and all kinds of revanchism could only cause damage. On the other hand, a modern foreign policy that is clear and acceptable to the big powers and a foreign policy free of any exaggerated self-assertion can only strengthen us. One should not "sell" the particular Hungarian interests in any sense of the word; instead, we should harmonize them with the common interests or big powers. And there are more and better conditions for this now.

Czech Attitude Toward Visegrad Work Criticized

AU2201181894 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Jan 94 p 3

[Tibor Kis editorial: "Farewell to Visegrad"]

[Text] When Czech President Vaclav Havel said that the Visegrad cooperation had exhausted its possibilities, he was actually right. Perhaps not the way he thought. It can certainly be seen as a fact that last week's Prague summit was the final blow to the Visegrad Four, and it seems completely improbable that this forum of regional cooperation could be saved in its current form. Actually, there is not much reason to save it in its current form. All along, Visegrad remained a dream and it never became anything like it had been intended or what it could have been if Prague had also wanted it. However, this way, it did not turn into a regional power center or a framework of political and economic cooperation—at the most, it was a political saloon, a discussion club, where the region's leaders passed some time together. This could not have had much practical use; it did not stop the economic links between the three—later four--Visegrad countries from breaking down, while the nations in question have not come closer together emotionally or politically, either. The main reason for this must be sought in the fact that, rather than seeing each other as partners, the governments of the given countries saw each other as rivals, or even as a burden hindering their march toward the West.

The only positive results of this cat-and-dog friendship arose almost completely independently of the participants, sometimes even against their wishes. They are very lucky that the West continues to treat the Visegrad countries as a group, and this has been to their definite advantage so far in their integration efforts.

The Prague summit brought important new elements into this situation. First of all, through offering the Partnership for Peace, Washington (although it still wants to see the four countries together) has resigned itself to the probable amplification of the rivalry and to an increased regional differentiation. Secondly, the Prague meeting also made it clear that the Czech Republic is canceling even the existing rudimentary forms of the Visegrad cooperation. The emerging new situation favors the strong, and according to all indications, Prague feels strong just now.

It would be pointless to dispute the Czech Republic's right to take a separate course from its neighbors, and to form its international relations independently of these countries, solely in accordance with its own interests. If Prague breaks with Visegrad—so be it. However, the others should, by all means, realize that the Czech Republic is trying to do this in such a way that, without it, nothing should be left of Visegrad. Naturally, this intent is perfectly understandable from Prague's point of view—a Visegrad without Czechs would be a serious counterbalance or alternative to Prague and the Czech way in Europe.

Up to now, in the Visegrad Four, everything has happened the way Prague wanted it; simply as a result of the decision-making mechanism based on consensus. Prague also shaped Visegrad's image to its current form—namely to be without character. Now, for the first time, the time has come to say no to Prague. It is simply not true that, in the current situation, Central Europe does not have any other common issues but free trade, which is the only issue urged by [Czech Prime Minister] Klaus.

Naturally, for Central Europe to be able to represent its particular interests, a Visegrad group that no longer has the Czechs (and whose place the Slovenians, for example, would obviously be happy to take) should radically change its views. Much more imagination, goodwill, trust, and tolerance would be needed. All the factors that are missing in this region.

However, this situation might change slowly because the circumstances might compel the affected nations in this direction. So far, the main objection against closer Central European cooperation has been the argument that it would force the states that are trying to get access to the western integration to wait too long. In the meantime, however, the same situation has arisen even while regional cooperation was being disarrayed. By now, it has become clear that Central Europe will have to wait a long time for European Union membership and for NATO membership. However, we will still have to carry on living somehow until this happens. For this reason alone, Central Europe is doomed to cooperate; in fact, a more effective regional cooperation would actually strengthen the region's position in the process of negotiations with the West.

If Prague realizes this fact, it is good. If it does not then the others will still have to make a step. Even without Prague.

Intelligence Official Views Activities

AU2201181794 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 20 Jan 94 pp 1, 4

[Correspondent's report on interview with Tibor Fuzessy, minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office, at Ferihegy Airport on 19 January: "We Must Pay Attention to Every Extremism"]

[Text] We interviewed Tibor Fuzessy, minister without portfolio in charge of the National Security Office, about cooperation between the Hungarian and Italian intelligence services and the experiences of his recent visit to Rome, at Ferihegy Airport on 19 January. Fuzessy also spoke about intelligence activity regarding the extremist political groupings.

"The late Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's widow and two children flew to Rome for the holy mass in memory of her husband on the same airplane as I did. Many people asked whether there was any political connection here"—Fuzessy told us. "This was only a coincidence, because we planned my trip to Rome well in advance; I paid an official visit, while the Antall family paid a personal visit to Rome."

Fuzessy told us that the cooperation between the two countries' intelligence services can now be openly called partnership relations. Control over the intelligence agencies was one of the major issues discussed at the meeting held at the partner organizations.

"The answer to this question is never easy and never free of debate"—Fuzessy pointed out. In Italy, for example, a group of several ministers is in charge of the intelligence services. "We are trying to find a solution that provides the best guarantee that the intelligence services cannot act against the law. This is an important issue in Italy too, where the political restructuring also affects the activity of the intelligence services."

Fuzessy told us that antiterrorist actions and the struggle against organized crime, money laundering, and the smuggling of weapons and drugs were the main subjects discussed in the course of his talks with the heads of Western intelligence services. "We succeeded in getting the Hungarian intelligence organizations accepted as partners at the talks"—Fuzessy added and said that this was one of the major achievements of recent years.

Organized crime is a relatively new development in the area of influence of the former Soviet Union and, naturally, in the former Yugoslavia. The Western intelligence organizations, including the Italian intelligence services, are very much interested in this development, and we succeeded in agreeing on the exchange of certain information, and we will receive information about the movement and actions of certain groups.

Then we asked Fuzessy for any information about extremist political groupings in Hungary, like the World National Popular Rule Party.

"Many parties often fear that the National Security Office keeps them under surveillance. This is not true. However, the National Security Office must keep an eye on everyone who has ideas or actions that could be anti-constitutional; namely those that aim at overthrowing the democratic state"—Fuzessy pointed out. It is the obligation of the National Security Office to pay attention to every political extremism, no matter on what side.

Fuzessy told us that the activity of a party becomes a crime when the party is striving to take over power. A fascist-type takeover of power, or any organized activity with this aim would already qualify as a crime. However, as long as a party declares such an ideology but wants to achieve its goals through democratic means, it cannot be called to account.

However, other manifestations, like the use of forbidden symbols, already border on crime. Incitement also qualifies as a crime. This is an area "that the extremist parties can easily slip into"—Fuzessy said in conclusion.

Kovac in Warsaw for Talks With Walesa

Walesa Welcomes Kovac

LD2501114294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1039 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Jan—On 25 January, President Lech Walesa welcomed to the Belweder Slovak President Michal Kovac, who is on his first official visit to Poland. The Sejm and senate speakers and the prime minster took part in the ceremony.

After the welcoming ceremony, both presidents began face-to-face talks. After this meeting, plenary talks will be held between the two delegations. A PAP journalist has learned unofficially that the agreements on regional cooperation and environmental protection will most probably not be signed. Representatives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had announced before that such agreements were to be signed.

Talks Begin; Leaders Comment

LD2501132594 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1156 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Jan—After a private meeting of presidents Lech Walesa and Michal Kovac, the Polish and Slovak delegations began plenary talks at Belweder Palace at noon.

President Walesa expressed hope that, in spite of many internal problems, both countries "will draw closer and closer." According to the president, the future lies in a Europe of "open borders" and regional cooperation. "We would like no decisions concerning us to be made in our absence," Walesa underscored.

According to the president, politicians of both countries are facing the task of opening up to greater economic cooperation. "I believe that we will manage to begin doing good and honest business, as it should be between neighbors."

President Kovac said that the Slovak Republic considers friendship with Poland to be one of the main pillars for building its international position. Kovac underscored that, although every state in the Visegrad Group will conclude individual agreements with NATO on the Partnership for Peace program, a "group is the best instrument to contribute to our admission to NATO."

To improve security in Europe, Kovac suggested regular contacts between the defense and internal affairs ministries of both countries.

Leaders Want Cooperation

LD2501165794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Slovak President Michal Kovac today started his official visit to Poland. Miroslav Karas, our Warsaw correspondent, reports:

[Karas] After his arrival by air shortly before noon, Michal Kovac first met his Polish counterpart for a half-hour talk. Lech Walesa stressed to journalists that this was the first visit of the president of independent Slovakia to Poland. We are neighbors, and we want to be good neighbors. We have a lot of internal political and economic problems, but their solution will bring us common results. I wish that nothing concerning us be undertaken in Europe without us. Regional cooperation is the future for the Europe of the 21st century, which will lead to the disappearance of borders, the Polish president said.

According to Michal Kovac, the Slovak Republic considers friendship with Poland one of the most important cornerstones in the building of the international position of Slovakia. For the first time in history, a situation has been created in which not only Slovakia and Poland, but more countries of the Central European region, have common and identical interests, the Slovak president said and added that, even if we are trying to overcome the division of Europe, we realize that it will be a long-term and complicated process, and one has to realize the fact that the countries of the Visegrad Group have their specific interests in this process.

In this connection, Kovac stressed that the Slovak Republic realizes the great significance of the mutual cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries in the sphere of security. Accepting the Partnership for Peace plan, which we will be concluding with NATO individually, should be an incentive for better cooperation and exchange of experiences. I am convinced that cooperation of the Visegrad Four is the most important thing we can contribute toward becoming bona fide members of NATO, Slovak President Michal Kovac said.

In the afternoon, he met Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, the minister of foreign economic relations, and Cardinal Glemp.

Expected Agreements Not Signed

LD2501163994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1536 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 25 Jan—Presidents Lech Walesa and Michal Kovac did not sign, as announced earlier, Polish-Slovak agreements on transborder and regional cooperation and on environmental protection.

As Wladyslaw Klaczynski, head of the Foreign Ministry Press and Information Department, explained, the agreements had not been signed for "technical reasons." The Slovak side put forward additional suggestions to the prepared agreements. Klaczynski announced that the agreements "would be signed in the immediate future."

A Polish-Slovak agreement on investment protection and on avoiding double taxation is also in the final phase of negotiations.

Pawlak To Visit Brussels, Meet EC Leaders

LD2401172694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1641 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 24 Jan—Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak will pay a working visit to Brussels on 2-3 February. During the visit, the government press office reports, he will meet NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner; Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission; Egon Klepsch, speaker of the European Parliament; W. van Eekelen, secretary general of the Western European Union; and Jean-Luc Dehaene, prime minister of Belgium.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers will also take part in a conference organized under the auspices of the Center of International Strategic Studies devoted to the future cooperation between Poland and the European Communities and NATO. A meeting with Poles living abroad is also expected.

Zhirinovskiy To Visit as Private Citizen

LD2401220594 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 2000 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[Text] [Announcer Krystyna Czubowna] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy will arrive in Poland on 27 January on a private visit. This was decided by Polish politicians, claims Janusz Bryczkowski, who has invited the leader of the Russian nationalists. In his opinion, ignoring a politician of this standing is proof of a lack of the self-preservation instinct.

[Correspondent Wojciech Hoflik] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy will be accompanied by his closest colleagues, including Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, deputy president of the Russian [State] Duma, among others. They will visit Warsaw, Krakow, Auschwitz, and Grunwald.

[Janusz Bryczkowski, leader of the Self-defense National Front, identified by caption] It is not a tribute to be paid to those who were murdered in Auschwitz. This was not our aim. The motivation was simply human curiosity of a man who would like to see the Auschwitz [concentration] camp. [video shows Bryczkowski speaking at a news conference]

[Hoflik] Up until now, no Polish politicians, other than the ones who support the [Self-Defense National] Front, have expressed their willingness to meet the leader of the Russian nationalists, although, according to Bryczkowski, they still have a chance to do so. It is even more worrying because this may be the last opportunity to improve the poor relations with our eastern neighbor, Janusz Bryczkowski believes. This is called for by Polish raison d'etat.

[Bryczkowski] Unfortunately, after the division of Europe imposed by Stalin, we were given a part of Europe to which we have no full territorial rights, and one must openly talk about this. However, one must also openly say that, despite the fact that we have no full rights to these territories that we were given, we will, at the same time, insist that the European borders not be changed, as Mr. Zhirinovskiy and other great Russian Federation politicians have declared it.

[Hoflik] Members of the Self-Defense National Front feel strong bonds with the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and are counting on close cooperation with this group. We are not Fascists, Bryczkowski stresses, unless everyone who struggles for sovereignty is a Fascist.

[Vladimir Voronkov, press councillor of the embassy of the Russian Federation, identified by caption, speaking in Polish to camera] This is Mr. Zhirinovskiy's private visit. He has not been invited by the Polish Sejm but by political parties. This is all I can say.

[Hoflik] Do you envisage the possibility of a scandal, like, for example, in Bulgaria?

[Voronkov] We hope it will not come to that.

[Hoflik] Is the embassy on alert?

[Voronkov] No, not at all.

Radio Reports Visit Postponed

LD2501120394 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, has postponed for a few days the date of his arrival in Poland. Janusz Bryczkowski, who invited Zhirinovskiy to Poland, told AFP that his guest will arrive in Poland not on Thursday but on Sunday [30 January] because of a visit to Belgrade, which had not been planned earlier.

Bryczkowski said in a telephone conversation last night that Zhirinovskiy expressed his concern about the lack of guarantees from the Polish authorities concerning his security during the visit to our country.

World Bank Talks With Polish Officials

LD2401181994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1642 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 24 Jan—Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, the deputy prime minister and justice minister, this afternoon received World Bank representative Kemal Dervis. During the meeting, officials from the Ministries of Health, Education, and Labor briefed the guest on how the credits were used and on the possible future needs of the ministries.

This morning the head of the World Bank mission met Marek Borowski, the deputy prime minister and finance minister, and Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, the president of the Polish National Bank. During the meeting with the deputy prime minister, Dervis announced that a World

Bank mission will come to Poland in March to review the existing loans and to discuss loans under negotiations.

Environment Protection Accord Signed With Ukraine

LD2401160194 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1500 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Polish and Ukrainian Government representatives have signed in Warsaw an agreement on environmental protection and also an agreement on handling dangerous waste. Both states decided to eliminate mutual ecological dangers as soon as possible, Stanislaw Zelichowski, Minister for Environment Protection, Natural Resources and Forestry said. [passage omitted]

Finance Minister on Foreign, Domestic Debt

WS2101155094 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 2015 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Studio debate by Polish Finance Minister Marek Borowski, former Finance Minister Jerzy Osiatynski, economist Professor Grzegorz Kolodko, and university student Piotr Poleski, moderated by Jerzy Baczynski on the "Only on One" program in Warsaw—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Baczynski, addressing Borowski] Mr. Minister, the prime minister—that is your boss—said that servicing the domestic debt has become a serious burden on the state. How serious is it?

[Borowski] Well, one can illustrate this through several examples. Let us take the 1994 expenditures devoted to the health service, which amount to a total of about 84 trillion zlotys [Z], whereas servicing our domestic debt amounts to Z82 trillion. The Defense Ministry's entire budget, about which there is currently a huge ongoing fight and debate, amounts to Z47 trillion. The Internal Affairs Ministry's entire budget—that is to say, for public security—amounts to more than Z20 trillion, and the budget of the Education Ministry is Z67 trillion. Or let us look at this from a different perspective: If it was not for the domestic debt incurred toward domestic banks and other institutions, we would have no budget deficit in 1994 at all. [passage omitted]

[Baczynski, addressing viewers] We are waiting for your responses to the following question, and let me remind you what it is: In a situation where the state lacks money to devote to important expenditures like the health service, education, or retirement pensions, should the state borrow money or not? Should it incur debts or should it not? We are waiting for your responses, and right now I can see that the result is, I think, four to one to No, so most of you so far think that the state budget should not incur a debt. We will see whether you will change your minds as the program continues.

Let me remind you that the biggest part of our debt is made up of debts incurred toward foreign creditors, which right now, Mr. Prime Minister [addressing Borowski], I think amounts to $47.5 billion, as far as I can recall....

[Borowski] The figure keeps changing everyday because the foreign-currency rates keep changing, but it is something like that.

[Baczynski] Please, tell us—how much will we have to spend this year to service this foreign debt?

[Borowski] Our assumptions are that it will have to be about Z30 trillion, which, taking the average dollar exchange rate for 1994, is about $1.3 billion.

[Baczynski] But this is based on the assumption that we will manage to get the debt reduction talked about during the background report?

[Borowski] Yes, it is based on that assumption. [passage omitted]

[Baczynski] So the situation looks like quite a paradox indeed: We are making efforts to have our debts—incurred in commercial banks—reduced, but if we manage to obtain the reduction, we will have to repay more than we have been paying up to now since up to now we have been servicing the debt only to some extent. But we are doing this—it is my understanding—among other things in order to obtain new credits. Which brings me to my next question to the minister and deputy prime minister: It is bad enough that we have this enormous burden of old debts, but we also keep incurring new ones. We heard data during the background report concerning the amount of money lent to us by the IMF, the World Bank, and the EBRD [European Bank for Reconstruction and Development]. After having had some experience with the state's finances already, do you think that we were justified in incurring those new credits? Are we using them the right way?

[Borowski] To kind of continue the tradition that Professor Osiatynski has initiated, I will also begin with something other than what the question was about. Namely, the professor talked here about the great success of "Solidarity" governments concerning the form of foreign-debt reduction. I share this view and that was indeed an achievement, but, in all fairness, we should add something that was not an achievement of "Solidarity" governments—namely, that these governments failed to sufficiently develop a proexport economy in Poland. What was supposed to be a lesser burden as a result of export development after a few years, after the reduction, when both the debt repayments and interest-rate repayments were supposed to begin increasing—unfortunately, that is getting ever less realistic currently, or it is being made very difficult since we are facing a major foreign-trade deficit and that is also a major problem that our economy is facing. [passage omitted] But I would like to answer Mr. Baczynski's question now.

[Baczynski] Thank you.

[Borowski] Well, regarding the credits you asked about, if we are to conduct a restructuring—I apologize to Mr. Student here for using the word—of the economy, and if we are to modernize industry, build highways, or modernize the telecommunications network, Poland of course does not have its own internal capital to accomplish all that. So Poland has to borrow money, but these are the types of loans that will pay back in the future, on the condition of course that they were made the right way....

[Baczynski] And were they in fact?

[Borowski, hesitating] I think we do not know everything regarding this issue right now since there are different messages coming in. I want to say that a World Bank mission will come to Poland in the near future to conduct evaluations along with us on how these credits are being used. There are some already known cases, which were also questioned by the Supreme Chamber of Control, of not very good use of these credits, but I would not like to make general statements in this regard. I think there are quite a few loans that are being implemented the right way. [passage omitted]

[Baczynski, addressing Kolodko] You just said, Professor: Is there anybody to borrow money from? I think we should return to the question asked by Mr. Poleski here—namely, who does the state borrow money from?

[Borowski] Exactly. Perhaps we should explain this since it is a fundamental issue. Well, in a situation of a budget deficit, which means revenue from taxes and other sources are lower than the budget expenditures, one must find a way of getting money from some source. People in Poland often talk in terms of: Well, the deficit is just something you can live with, there is always a way to finance it, we can always write it down and then spend the money somehow. But the problem is the budget must have a way of finding the money that is the deficit, so where will it find it? Well, the government can of course sell its securities among other things, such as television commercials, and perhaps our student colleague here has even purchased one already, and, if not, I recommend it highly since it really pays back.... [passage omitted]

So like I said, government securities are one way but there is not much to be gained this way, and the other possibility that was used extensively was simply through bank loans. Banks have money they collect from citizens.... [passage omitted]

I would like to present an interesting interpretation of the domestic debt issue here. Let us look at it this way: Banks have collected money from citizens, then they lent the money to the state Treasury, that is the budget. The budget then spent the money....

[Baczynski, interrupting] For socially justifiable reasons?

[Borowski] Undoubtedly they were socially justifiable reasons, and this way the citizens also used the money because, after all, employees of the health service, the education system, the Army, and so forth—all of them are citizens. So one can put it this way, at the expense of some simplification: Some citizens lent money to some other citizens. Perhaps in some cases they were even the same people since after all, the savings were collected by everyone. All this money was processed through the banks and through the budget itself and so what am I getting at? Well, what I am getting at is that if there are some people out there today who perhaps say: Why don't we just not repay that? After all, these are state-owned banks and a state-owned budget so what is the fuss all about? Well, what I am saying to that is that would simply mean that somebody will not get his money if the debt is not repaid. So not repaying the debt is out of the question here. What is possible with foreign debt for instance, in terms of some form of negotiation of debt remission, delays in repayments and so forth since at the other end you have enormous banks with enormous potentials—well, that is not possible with regard to domestic debt. [passage omitted]

Minister, Central Bank Argue Over Budget Deficit

AU2301192294

[Editorial Report] Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak on 17 January on page 2 carries a 250-word TA SR report entitled "Priority of the Finance Department: Introducing Clarity Into Incomes." The report quotes an interview given by Finance Minister Julius Toth to the TA SR on 16 January, in which he discussed the "priorities of the Ministry of Finance this year." Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 20 January on page 2 carries a 600-word TA SR report entitled "Even Though There Is No Agreement, They Are Doing It." The report quotes a statement issued by the Slovak National Bank [NBS] in response to the Toth interview.

The TA SR report in the 17 January issue of Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak includes the following passage: "In an interview for the TA SR, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Julius Toth said that introducing good order and exactness into state budget incomes and expenditures was one of the priorities of the finance department this year. According to his words, it was precisely this issue that was causing considerable problems in the first year of independent Slovakia's existence. The NBS, which monitors expenditures, was not able to carry out certain studies and analyses that would show in which areas the budget management was getting into an undesirable situation."

In its response in the 20 January issue of Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak, the NBS terms Toth's remark "a surprising assertion" because "according to the legal system, it is the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic that is responsible for the formulation and implementation of the state budget." The NBS statement goes on to say: "Under the law on the NBS, monitoring expenditures of the state budget is not among the duties of the central bank, and no agreement

on such activity has been concluded between the NBS and the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic. In spite of this, central bank staffers prepare regular reports on the development of the budget economy and on the government's net position regarding individual items and draw attention to key problems." According to the NBS, "in the course of 1993, the NBS repeatedly notified the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic about the unfavorable development of the budget and demanded that appropriate measures be adopted to keep the budget deficit within acceptable limits. With this in mind, an agreement had been reached to limit the drawing of budget expenditures to a total 165 billion Slovak korunas [Sk] by 31 December 1993. In the last days of December, it was decided to exceed this limit, as a result of which budget expenditures reached Sk167.1 billion. The NBS had not been informed about this decision in advance." In concluding, the NBS statement points out that the Ministry of Finance itself is preparing monthly reports on the state budget fulfillment, which detail the development of individual items of budget revenues and expenditures.

fense Issues

PM2401100094 Wroclaw SLOWO POLSKIE in Polish 12 Jan 94 p 11

["Unauthorized" article by Jan Wawrzyniak on the news conference given by Major General Stanislaw Koziej of the National Security Bureau on 11 January in Wroclaw: "Let Us Not Fear Invasion"]

[Text] Yesterday, Major General Stanislaw Koziej of the National Security Bureau visited Wroclaw. His schedule included, among other things, a meeting with the command personnel of the Officers' Higher School of Mechanized Military Units in Czajkowskiego Street. General Koziej promoted his latest book entitled *The Theory of the Military Art* [Teoria sztuki wojennej]. After the meeting, he held a brief press conference, during which reporters fired a volley of questions at him.

[Question] Following the NATO summit in Brussels, certain circles in Poland have come to believe that the decisions made at the summit have reinforced the situation whereby we are kept in a certain state of vacuum, in military isolation. Are there reasons for us to be afraid?

[Koziej] The state of anxious concern is to a certain extent justified by our sense of finding ourselves in a "gray security zone." However, I would certainly be disinclined to dramatize this situation and to react to it nervously. From the viewpoint of Polish interests, the concept of "Partnership for Peace" defines the limits of what we can now realistically attain. However, we must not forget that, as a result of a concentrated diplomatic campaign conducted, among others, by President Lech Walesa and [Foreign] Minister Olechowski, the general formula for the partnership has acquired a tangible content. For example, we know that by following that path we will eventually come to NATO. I believe that much will still depend on our taking our own initiative. Poland should press for the signing of a specific agreement with NATO that would take into account the timetable of activities that can bring us closer to a rapprochement with the Atlantic Treaty. However, it must not be a register of wishful thinking on our part, but a cool political and economic calculation.

[Question] How would our rapprochement with NATO look from the purely military perspective?

[Koziej] The West has been putting out certain signals and directions. To begin with, it should involve participation by the Polish armed forces in joint exercises and maneuvers in order to achieve a degree of perfection in cooperation at headquarters level and in joint operations. In addition, our armed forces should take part in peace missions alongside NATO forces' soldiers. I believe that these are good ways of achieving mutual adjustment of our respective military structures. I will not deny that the greatest problem will be posed by our need to adjust to the high technology applied in NATO command, communications, and reconnaissance systems. On the other hand, we have nothing to be ashamed of when we compare the levels of theoretical and practical knowledge at the command of our officers' cadres, or the training of our soldiers.

[Question] But are we prepared for the possibility that, despite all the declarations and promises, the entrance door to NATO will, in the end, be slammed shut against us—in our faces, so to speak?

[Koziej] I do not share such fears. After all, certain changes and transformations are bound to take place even within the Atlantic Treaty itself. Even today, that structure is not altogether capable of coping successfully with all the tasks that the present day requirements place before it. I believe that, over the next few years, we will undergo an inevitable evolution of the entire system of European security. It is not outside the bounds of possibility that it will eventually become NATO's policy to accept all willing partners into the ranks of its self-reforming structure.

[Question] Including Russia and Ukraine?

[Koziej] Time will tell. Let me reiterate that, in my opinion, a joint security system will eventually evolve in Europe on the basis of NATO, and that the West will constitute its nucleus and its guarantor.

[Question] General, could Poland be threatened by a military conflict likely to develop in Central Europe?

[Koziej] We could be tempted into all manner of theoretical musings on that subject. For example, the Americans recently considered the possibility of a major invasion threatening Poland from the East and concluded that, in such an eventuality, we would be utterly defeated—a conclusion that is not particularly surprising when we consider the existing ratio of forces. Personally, I believe that we will not be seriously threatened with a

direct and total military invasion from the East within a foreseeable future. I would rather perceive a real threat for Poland in the possibility of local conflicts erupting in the vicinity of our state borders—for example, if uncontrollable nationalistic feelings come to a head in Slovakia, Ukraine, or Russia. It would be relatively easy then for "offshoots" of those disturbances to penetrate our own territories.

[Question] What is the current military potential of our own 250,000-strong armed forces?

[Koziej] We have at our disposal a military potential that currently permits us chiefly to carry out effective defense. Insofar as our capabilities allow, we will strive to adjust to the requirements of the contemporary universal military art, drawing on the theoretical achievements of both East and West European armies. With the passage of time, our armed forces should increasingly assume the character of combined air-and-surface formations in consideration of the potential at the disposal of our hypothetical adversaries. The rule that the stronger of the two adversaries dictates the rules of the game will always hold true.

[Question] Does this mean that certain changes in the Polish armed forces are inevitable?

[Koziej] It would be difficult to deny that they are inevitable. It is not inconceivable that the Polish defense system could demonstrate a certain inefficiency even before the end of this year. Consequently, political decisionmakers should look at the problems associated with the functioning of the Army not only in the perspective of just one term of office but also in a longer time scale. For quite a while now, President Walesa and the National Security Bureau have insisted that adequate levels of budget resources be allocated for defense. In my opinion, we should aim to have a small but extremely-well-trained and well-equipped Army in Poland. I believe that we should gradually convert to professional, career military service assisted by contract military service. Of course, reserve military training should still be preserved in addition to those two main forms of military service. An army that is composed predominantly of career servicemen need not be more expensive to run than one made up of drafted soldiers; one European example that proves this thesis is that of the British military service.

[Question] The alderman of Koscierzyna parish has offered to allocate 1 billion zlotys of his parish funds to benefit the National Defense Fund. Do you think that a nationwide collection, held in peacetime, for such a purpose is a good idea, or is it merely a case of a disproportionately emotive initiative that could only alarm our neighbors unduly?

[Koziej] I would assess that particular initiative in positive terms. At the same time, I believe that it is an expression of an understandable public concern over the Polish armed forces' material condition. Perhaps as a result of it politicians will now turn their attention more closely to the problem it highlights. To go back to your question, however, we could easily picture a situation where each voivodship would make a contribution toward the purchase of three modern tanks by the Army. Surely there would be nothing wrong in such a scheme? In any case, I believe that the extramilitary sector is the weakest link in our defense system. I am thinking here of the levels of knowledge and awareness of a whole range of defense issues prevalent among our population. There is, however, a marked improvement on that score among the voivodas, which was noticeable as early as last year. Nevertheless, there is still much scope for improvement in our central administration and within individual ministries.

Daily Critical of Public Television Head

WS2401134794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22-23 Jan 94 p 2

[Commentary by Bozena Wawrzewska under the "Observations" rubric]

[Text] As the date for granting a license for the all-national television station is drawing closer, emotions are soaring higher and higher. All kinds of speculations are emerging; we can see people not really taking understandable measures related to the possibility of getting the future license. The council suggests mergers, even though people did not establish their companies to merge them with others. Reuter, for one, joined TV-7, and it is not at all certain whether it would like to merge with the Association of Entertainment Enterprises, for instance. At any rate, there is a lot of bustling activity around this issue.

However, even though private television has not started operating yet, certain behavior of the public television seems to be a little strange. Directly before airing the interrogation of the National Council of Radio and Television [KRRiT], our television showed the studio of one of the candidates—POLSAT. In a report on the KRRiT press conference, aired on the main "Panorama" newscast, there was the following statement: There are rumors that POLSAT has quite a big chance. Wieslaw Walendziak, president of the public television and former POLSAT director, at a meeting with students at the Journalism Center, in which he participated along with the present POLSAT Director Boguslaw Chrabota, expressed hope, as the SIS agency reports, that POLSAT would soon obtain the license for an all-national television. On the following day, he made the following statement exclusively for SIS: "There is no precise view as to who should obtain the license for an all-national television; however, I would not be very worried or surprised if one of the fundamental elements of commercial television were POLSAT television, where I worked for a year."

Anyone who has worked in television is aware of the power of this medium and of the various interests that cross with each other there. He also knows all the

influences and interdependence in television. The state-run television as well as its previous managers were often accused—frequently not without cause—of yielding to political influence and pressures. Public television is supposed to be the guarantee of objectivity and impartiality. Therefore, I do not think it would be good if right at the beginning it made people think that political influence was replaced by other kinds of influence.

Visa Rules for Transiting Yugoslavs Tightened

LD2401200794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1747 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Warsaw, 24 January—Poland will not allow into the country refugees from the former Yugoslavia, who may be sent back from Sweden and travel on transit through our country, unless the Swedes ensure in advance that they are in possession of Czech and Slovak transit visas, Jaroslaw Molga, spokesman for the Border Guard Main Headquarters said on 24 January. Polish-Swedish talks on this issue are in progress.

Last Friday [21 January], the Czechs and Slovaks prevented a group of 55 Albanians from crossing the border. They had to travel through Ukraine instead, Molga told a PAP journalist.

The Czech Republic has recently introduced visas for citizens from the former Yugoslavia, which has made the transit of refugees on the way back [from Sweden] complicated.

Leszek Czerwonka, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] border traffic department, told a PAP journalist that there was an agreement on this matter between Poland and Sweden. According to this agreement, Sweden can send back through our country those refugees who have failed to be granted refugee status and who arrived in Sweden during the period when that country did not have visa-authorized traffic with the former Yugoslavia, and who have been illegally extending their stay. These refugees are transported through Poland by the Swedes in coaches that are paid by them. In accordance with this agreement, such groups cross the border of the Polish Republic in Swinoujscie and in Chyzne and Cieszyn. [passage omitted including passage indistinct]

The MSZ Office for Immigration and Refugees said that citizens from the former Yugoslavia on their way back through Poland do not ask for political asylum in our country.

Iliescu Comments After Talks With PDSR

AU2401195894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 21 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Dorina Baesu in Bucharest on 20 January: "Brief Interview With Mr. Ion Iliescu After the Talks Between the Social Democracy Party of Romania and the President: 'I Agree With Salagean'"]

[Text] [Baesu] Today, during your talks with the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], the PDSR leaders asked you to further remain actively involved in the negotiations it will conduct with the opposition. Are you going to do that?

[Iliescu] This is what I am actually doing. I believe that today's discussions with the PDSR are the start of the second stage of the meetings with all parties. I will stay involved.

[Baesu] Therefore, the negotiations with the opposition—which, in the opinion of Mr. Nastase [PDSR executive president], are bound to last a long time—will begin. Until then, a coalition government between the PDSR and the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] will be formed. Will this coalition not damage the country's image?

[Iliescu] It might do some damage, but this is the formula that resulted from the discussion.

[Baesu] But why was it absolutely necessary to form a government with the PUNR?

[Iliescu] This is not necessary, but inevitable.

[Baesu] Why?

[Iliescu] Because it offers stability, for the time being.

[Baesu] PUNR senator Viorel Salagean claims that such a government will not only damage the country's image, but it will not last too long, either.

[Iliescu] I agree with Salagean, but the party should also agree with him.

[Baesu] What do you have to say about the fact that several politicians, including Adrian Nastase, were accused by Corneliu Vadim Tudor [president of the Greater Romania Party-PRM] of being CIA spies?

[Iliescu] This is stupid and despicable. He could be sued for that. It is proof of his irresponsibility.

[Baesu] Nevertheless, the PRM is still the PDSR's ally. Is such an alliance not being perceived negatively?

[Iliescu] I agree with you. It is perceived rather badly.

[Baesu] Then, what should be done to ensure that the PDSR is no longer obliged to have such an ally as the PRM?

[Iliescu] We must create another political climate, of understanding among the democratic forces. However, I would like to emphasize that I do not identify the parties with their figures. A man is not a party. As a matter of fact—I do not want to name any names right now—there are certain elements in the Democratic Convention (people—our editorial note), that are by no means any more credible or desirable than some individuals from the current majority.

[Baesu] Still, none of the Convention's leaders has ever made a statement like Corneliu Vadim Tudor's.

[Iliescu] Well, let me assure you that they have made quite a few statements, and how!

[Baesu] Can you give some concrete examples...

[Iliescu] Is there a need for examples? By the way, what newspaper do you work for?

[Baesu] ROMANIA LIBERA.

[Iliescu] You see? Just the insolence of the writings of Petre Mihai Bacanu and Octavian Paler would suffice as examples of that.

Iliescu's Rejection of CDR Offer Examined

AU2301175794 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 18 Jan 94 p 1

[Octavian Paler editorial: "Searching for Explanations"]

[Text] It is obvious that the opposition has decided to leave aside the nebulous sphere of principles and to take the practical and decisive step of holding out its hand to the current power, with a view to taking the country out of the crisis. The representatives of the Democratic Convention [CDR] overcame their doubts and went to the meeting at Cotroceni [presidential palace] with the offer to form a new governmental coalition. The only nonnegotiable condition they put forward was that the coalition should distance itself from the extremist parties. It became equally obvious that this hand was turned down in more or less polite terms. Probably surprised by such an unequivocal offer, Ion Iliescu found no better solution than to repeat his vague remarks about the "political pact" to which he is inviting the parties, thus proving that he does not really want a solution to the crisis through sharing power with the opposition, but rather a political "hora" [Romanian folk dance] around the crisis. The end of the Cotroceni meeting looked like a display of all cards out on the table, with the recognition of the fact that the negotiations were a bluff.

Less clear is why Ion Iliescu does not want to hear anything about the current suffering of the Romanians and the poor administration of the country in the years that have elapsed since the revolution. Does he really believe that everything is linked to some fatalistic notions and the hardships of transition? Now, when we are much worse off, not only compared to the Poles, Czechs, or Hungarians, but also to the Bulgarians, who

are also in a transition process, we cannot find another explanation for such beliefs—without feeling offended—than that the president has lost all contact with reality. Then, it is also not at all clear why Ion Iliescu stubbornly ignores the disastrous opinion of the majority of the population about Vacaroiu's government and why he still does not fear an alliance of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] with the extremist parties, in the light of the international uproar around Zhirinovskiy's circus. Is is possible that nothing matters—not even the country being brought to ruin by an incompetent and corrupt government and not even the reticence of the outside world—when the interests of personal power are at stake? Ion Iliescu has let us understand that all he wanted was a pact through which all the political forces would side with those who are administering the catastrophe. His secret dream seems to be to turn political pluralism into a kind of ideological federation or national symposium, where everybody comes up with his ideas and throws them together into the pile, after which they pledge to no longer have any other objections. He seems to dismiss the fact that the role of political pluralism in the democratic world is to ensure a governing alternative and a competition of programs, not an amalgam of strategies. But then, we want to be original at all costs, don't we? Here comes up, in a new version, the old idea of a "front," within which one can argue over details, as long as the minority subordinates itself to the majority.

At the level of the end results, things are rather clear. It is the cause that is more unclear. How can one explain the negative answer that came from Cotroceni? It is not easy to find an explanation to that, since there might be several.

1. Ion Iliescu is the spokesman (some say "the prisoner") of certain forces that do not want a change, but rather the consolidation of the restoration; this should be done quietly, and if one can no longer have the graveyard quiet of Ceausescu's days, at least it should be the quiet of resignation.

2. Ion Iliescu is convinced that he has become master of the situation and can now afford to ignore all suffering and discontent.

3. Ion Iliescu feels more secure amid the insults and flattery coming from the extremist parties than alongside certain parties that talk too much about truth, reform, and Europe.

4. Ion Iliescu cannot overcome his resentment toward the CDR leaders, who have often criticized him. Consequently, anything the Convention offers him, except applause, should be rejected.

5. Ion Iliescu cannot escape the limits of his Gorbachev-like thinking.

In the end, regardless of what the cause may be, to defend the morass into which we are sinking is a dangerous game.

Nastase Criticized for Accepting PUNR Offer

AU2401082294 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jan 94 p 1

[Article by Anton Uncu: "Our Leaders"]

[Excerpt] We Romanians say that whenever God wants to punish someone, he first makes them go out of their mind. After that, there is no need to punish them any further for their sins because they will punish themselves anyway. In this sense, the case of Adrian Nastase [executive chairman of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR, and speaker of the Chamber of Deputies] can be very eye-opening. Ever since the [December 1989] revolution, he has been trying to portray himself as a democratic, intelligent, impartial, and so on politician. And why should we not admit that he really has all the necessary prerequisites to become what he wants to be. He can speak eloquently, he is calm, he has a good memory, good looks... However, for some reason unknown to us, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies recently lost his memory. He has forgotten, for instance, that a month ago, he told correspondents that the party he represents would never accept the blackmail of PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party], which, at that time, conditioned its cooperation [with the ruling party] on being offered a number of ministerial portfolios. Nastase's indignation seemed real and worthy of our respect. However, a few days ago, the official PDSR leader changed his views. The PUNR blackmail does not concern him in the least; on the contrary, he ceremoniously announced that the PDSR and PUNR have established an alliance intending to govern the country. The portfolios, which a month ago he considered to be the motive of the blackmail, are included, of course—at least, this is what we think. The whole thing reminds us of a great Romanian lawyer who manages to prove that the defendant is a scoundrel who should be sent to jail, after which, within a few minutes, he also manages to demonstrate that he is as innocent as an angel... In today's Romania, this is how the official leader of the ruling party turns black into white and white into black, turning the whims of a spoiled child determined to ruin the toy he has just received as a present into a political act. The toy is nothing but Romania's Government, the leadership of which is also coveted by the man who rings the bell in the hall of the Chamber of Deputies... [passage omitted]

PUNR Senator Cited on Talks, Party Relations

AU2401100094 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Jan 94 p 3

[Interview with Viorel Salagean, Romanian National Unity Party senator, by Simona Popescu; place and date not given: "For the Time Being PUNR Appears in the Political Arena as an Extremist Party"]

[Text] [Popescu] Mr. Gheorghe Funar [president of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR] affirms that your recent declarations stem from the fact that you have

not been chosen to participate in negotiations with the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] or for the meeting at Cotroceni....

[Salagean] Mr. Funar makes many affirmations and all of them in his characteristic style that he always uses in public. However, I believe that this time he has been misinformed. In any event, he cannot be correctly informed about my activity because he is in Cluj and I am in Bucharest.

[Popescu] President Funar explains your statements by saying that you have been sick for a few months.

[Salagean] We are not talking about statements that might be connected to a situation when I was allegedly annoyed for some reason. There is only one thing that really upsets me and that is stupidity. And when stupidity crosses my path and I cannot avoid it, then I try to push it forcefully aside. Let me explain this. There was no question of my being excluded from those negotiations. I must draw the attention of Mr. Funar and of those who believe in the words spread by him to the following: The first discussions that I held on the PUNR's participation in the government took place at the beginning of September 1993 and three people participated in them, namely, [PUNR Vice President] Ioan Gavra, [PUNR Deputy] Valeriu Tabara, and myself. The talks were held in the the prime minister's office. After we had presented him with certain aspects of our policy and also named a few ministries that we were interested in, he suggested that the discussions should not continue at that stage with the government but should rather be transferred to the two parties. Thus, the discussions continued with the FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front, now the PDSN] leaders. Therefore, I participated in the initial stage of these negotiations. As far as my alleged annoyance about the nonparticipation in the Cotroceni talks is concerned, such rumors are no novelty. There was no question of annoyance whatsoever. I stated that I did not want to participate in those talks with the president in Mr. Funar's presence, because I do not want to blush when I hear original political fabrications uttered in front of the country's president. I have respect for that institution.

[Popescu] As far as we know, until recently, even the Cotroceni itself imposed an embargo on PUNR President Funar.

[Salagean] I do not know what his relations are with the Cotroceni. However I know that when I participate in negotiations, I do not want to blush in shame for statements that I hear uttered by my colleagues in the talks. This time the PUNR's Bureau probably took into consideration this past principle of mine to refuse to participate in PUNR meetings at the presidency when Mr. Funar is present. This is the true story. Certainly I would have liked, exceptionally, to participate in the latest meeting because I had something to say in front of the president, namely, to tell him not to commit the error that has already been circulated and that has started to take shape, that is, discussing PUNR participation in the government. Such a political act could disrupt all the political forces in our country in the present circumstances. I shared these thoughts with some of my colleagues and that may be the explanation of why I was not included in the talks.

[Popescu] It seems that the PDSR and the PUNR have already established the latest details.

[Salagean] Unfortunately, I notice with the greatest surprise that the discussions between the PDSR and the PUNR are being kept very secret, mainly from certain senators and deputies. However, they are not being kept secret from the press and other parties. I have learned from the press what the PUNR's demands are. They have named four or five ministries and I was surprised to see this, as I know that we have no adequate people for any of those ministries. Our offers—and please do not ask me to name names because I will not do so—were circulated in the press and I suppose that these are indeed the ones, but I do not want you to hear them from me. Those people are below the level of being able to compete with those who currently occupy these positions, that is, the ministerial portfolios. Thus, this is the major reason why I think that the offer of the PUNR is frail, very weak, and lacking in consistency.

[Popescu] In this case, the PUNR's request to participate in the government was mainly based on vanity?

[Salagean] I believe that currently—to use the familiar phrases—there are a few PUNR people who want to be in the government, having already entered the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, or becoming prefects, subprefects, or I do not even know what kind of important post, such as general directors in certain ministries or secretaries of state. They want by any means possible to see themselves, at least for a week or two, a month, or perhaps even a year as a minister. Certainly, we are talking here more about vanity than the desire or the power to do anything useful for the country. In addition, you should not forget that accepting the PUNR in government or establishing a biparty government structure—I believe—would be a real danger, a very bad signal sent toward Europe. No matter what we want to do, no matter how we want to change our image, for the time being the PUNR appears in the political arena to be an extremist party. However, I refuse to believe that the PUNR is in its structures an extremist party. But, through its leaders and through the attitude of those leaders—and in this respect I am primarily thinking of Mr. Funar—through many of his willful and irresponsible attitudes and hasty gestures and actions, the PUNR is burdened with this label of an extremist party.

[Popescu] How representative is the current PUNR leadership?

[Salagean] I would like to believe that for the spirit of the PUNR, Mr. Funar is not in the least representative. His declarations and actions, at least the most recent ones, are either made on his own behalf, or by a furious

person, or they are those of the mayor of Cluj. Many senators whom I know very well distance themselves from those declarations as soon as they are uttered. It is absolutely necessary to make changes in the PUNR leadership. Otherwise, there is the danger that the PUNR will join and discredit this government, which can hardly stand upright. But, there is also the danger that the PUNR will be continuously discredited by Mr. Funar's willful attitude. I believe that we should not now unnecessarily stir up nationalism.

[Popescu] What will you do if Mr. Funar's removal from the PUNR's leadership is not successful? Will you resign?

[Salagean] I am not one to give up a fight. I feel capable of fighting, and I am not ill as Mr. Funar has implied with his characteristic cynicism. In any event, he may not know it, but a heart attack has nothing to do with mental disease, from which many of the current leaders of this party suffer. I believe that Mr. Funar will understand the current danger that faces the PUNR mainly because of his willful and hasty gestures and he himself will find the solutions. One of these would be to resign and to devote himself to his mayor's office in Cluj. Another might be to convene an extraordinary congress of the party and to discuss all the issues openly, without arrangements of the type made at the time when Mr. Radu Ceontea [former PUNR leader], who was one of the founders of the party—and he certainly had his own failings—was removed from the political scene of the PUNR and a person like Mr. Funar, who has brought much, very much disrepute onto the party, should be kept at the helm. Common sense would compel us to make a decision in this respect.

[Popescu] According to your information, are there many members of your party who share your ideas?

[Salagean] I have never carried out an opinion poll in this respect, but, knowing very many PUNR members, I believe that common sense will force them to move to my side and support the idea of changes within the PUNR.

[Popescu] Recently we were informed that President Iliescu wants to use you to eliminate the PUNR from the negotiations. Similarly, it is known that the PDSR at one point set conditions for the continuation of the negotiations, namely the removal of Mr. Funar.

[Salagean] This is an interesting interpretation; I have never thought of this. I would like to state very clearly that I have held no discussions whatsoever in the past year with any person connected with the Cotroceni. Such an interpretation would certainly be a forced one and I deny it because I had no contacts whatsoever, not even with Mr. Adrian Nastase. On the contrary, I would like to say that, the most violent attack on Mr. Nastase, when he made those statements about the behavior of certain PUNR leaders and suggested the need for a change of mentalities within the PUNR, which was aimed at controlling Mr. Funar, and even suggested his removal, may have been from me when I intervened most forcefully at the news conference, saying that we do not accept anybody interfering in our affairs. There I defended the idea of the independence of a party. We rejected the idea of making little signs to signal that "it is not good what you are doing." But it is certain that we basically agreed with Mr. Adrian Nastase! Changes can start within the PUNR only through an internal impetus, not an external one. I can state categorically that such an interpretation is completely erroneous. I also have many fundamental criticisms of President Iliescu. One of them is connected with current events. I have understood that President Iliescu is separating two elements that should complement each other concerning the negotiations at the Cotroceni, the move toward a political pact and the move toward a new government. These two things cannot be separated. Otherwise, it means nothing more than a dialogue between the deaf.

Socialist Party Supports PDSR-PUNR Talks

AU2401181294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] During today's news conference of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], Deputy Chairman Tudor Mohora presented the stance of his party regarding the recent negotiations between the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] and the PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party] intended to set up a coalition government and the talks among the parties that support the current government, which concluded on Friday [21 January] evening.

The PSM believes that the negotiations between the PUNR and the PDSR should be continued and concluded. Regardless of their outcome, those negotiations have had a beneficial effect so far in the sense that they have highlighted the need to clarify relations among the ruling party and the parties that support the government, Mohora emphasized.

As far as the PSM is concerned, that party is not interested primarily in who the new members of the government will be, but rather in the way the new executive will govern. In that sense, the PSM has said that an agreement should be concluded in writing among all the parties supporting the new government. The document should establish the way and the means by which they will support the act of governing. The PSM has also requested that an anticrisis program should be urgently elaborated.

During the talks that concluded last Friday they also proposed the establishment of a political pact that should be open for all parties, regardless of whether they are represented in parliament or not, which should comprise a number of political ideas that are acceptable for all, without, however, being connected to the act of government.

Mohora also mentioned the fact that, during the talks last Friday, the idea emerged to set up an alliance of the

parties that support the government and they discussed the possibility of establishing a multi-color government in the long run.

In the conclusion of the news conference Mohora announced that PSM Chairman Ilie Verdet is currently in Paris, where he is attending the proceedings of the French Communist Party congress. During their stay in France the PSM leaders intend to contact left-wing political groupings from other countries, our correspondent Anca Ionescu reports.

Coposu Predicts Short Reign for Coalition

AU2401181094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] The future coalition government [between the Social Democracy Party of Romania, PDSR, and the National Romanian Unity Party, PUNR] will not survive more than three months, emphasized Corneliu Coposu, National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party [PNTCD] chairman, during today's weekly news conference. Coposu based his assertion on the fact that the participation of the PUNR in the new government will ensure the country neither stability at home nor credibility abroad. The PNTCD chairman also stressed the fact that, judging from the information he holds, the West considers the PUNR to be an expression of extremism that exceeds even that of the Greater Romania Party [PRM]. In the same context, Coposu assessed that the new government formula will lead to restoration and the blocking of reform.

PNTCD Spokesman Radu Vasile assessed that a situation will be created that everyone thought had been brought to an end in 1989.

Talking about the rejection of the opposition's offer to assume the responsibility of governing, the PNTCD leaders considered it natural that the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] and the PRM will also be included in the executive, as those parties support the current government, our correspondent Elena Perdichi reports.

New UN Forces Commander Replaces Briquemont

AU2401182094 Paris AFP in English 1705 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, Jan 24 (AFP)—British General Sir Michael Rose took over Monday the troubled command of the UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina amid hot debate on what the international community's policy should be to end the civil war.

Rose, 54, a former head of the elite commandos of Britain's Special Air Service (SAS), replaced Belgian General Francis Briquemont, who was recalled after just six months. He will be in charge of the 13,042 UN soldiers deployed in Bosnia in an effort to hold the ring between warring Moslems, Serbs and Croats.

In an interview broadcast earlier Monday by the French radio station Europe-1 from the French Alps, where he was leading a military ski team over the weekend, Rose said Bosnia was "a challenge I won't shrink from." He said he had visited Sarajevo a fortnight ago and found the troops in good spirits, doing their job very well.

Rose was formally installed in a ceremony at Sarajevo airport by French General Jean Cot, overall military head of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia, who is also being pulled out in March after becoming increasingly outspoken.

He welcomed Rose on to the Bosnian stage, where he said the "threshold of the absurd" had already been exceeded, adding, "I know you will apply all your clear thinking and determination to the brutal task which awaits you."

Cot recalled the "difficult and sometimes frustrating" circumstances of the UN mission to Bosnia "because we are not here to make war, but to help a peace process which is getting bogged down and to allow exhausted populations to survive." Cot also accused the warring sides of using the peacekeepers and humanitarian aid workers as pawns on their "political chessboard."

Rose defended himself against suggestions that he had come to oversee the withdrawal of British UN troops from Bosnia, saying "That is not part of our intention at the moment."

He said the most prominent problems for now were "the security of humanitarian aid convoys and assistance with the peace negotiations, which continue all the time in this country at the technical level."

Earlier, Cot presented Briquemont with a medal for "exceptional services rendered" on behalf of UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. [passage omitted]

French foreign ministry spokesman Richard Duque said Juppe had asked Washington to join the efforts of the European Community to bring about a negotiated settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressing that the warring sides all appeared to be seeking a military solution.

Juppe had stressed that the United States, the European Community and Russia should develop a joint approach to the problem, of which air strikes were only one aspect.

Rose 'at Odds' With UN Leaders

LD2401222894 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1947 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Article by defense correspondent Charles Miller]

[Excerpt] Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose placed himself at odds with his United Nations masters today as he took command of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.

The former SAS [Special Air Service] chief insisted that the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) must have the right to call immediate air strikes to deter attacks on its soldiers and bases. And he said he did not disagree with the departing commander, Belgian Lt. Gen Francis Briquemont, who warned that UNPROFOR was suffering a crisis of confidence as it was not given the means to do the job.

Gen Rose, 54, who was formally sworn in as commander of the 12,000-strong UN force in Bosnia at Sarajevo, said UNPROFOR had enough men to escort UN aid convoys into central Bosnia but not to guard "safe havens." He added: "My first briefing... indicates to me that we do have the resources that we need in this country, certainly to assist properly with the aid convoys."

But Gen. Briquemont, asked to comment, said: "I don't know how many times I shall have to repeat that we do not have enough means, both in Croatia and in Bosnia."

The overall commander for UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, French General Jean Cot, said reforms were being made to allow UNPROFOR to fulfill its task of escorting aid and protecting civilians.

Gen. Cot, who will be replaced in March after being dismissed for disagreeing openly with UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, stressed that UNPROFOR needed to be able to call in air power within 30 minutes to deter attacks on soldiers and bases.

"The problem is very simple. In case of a massive attack on a 'safe area', the only means to immediately and powerfully respond is air support," he said. "Immediately means three minutes. That would be very good. One half hour, that would be a must. It's not three hours."

Gen. Rose said: "I agree absolutely with General Cot. We should have the right of immediate response."

There is deep concern at all levels within UNPROFOR over its impotence as the warring factions block aid convoys and lay siege to UN "safe havens."

Britain, France and Canada are considering withdrawing their forces in early summer unless a peace accord is agreed and the aid operation is allowed to continue unhindered.

Asked whether he had been brought in to organise the withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia, Gen. Rose replied: "That is not a part of our intentions at the moment."

Gen. Cot said: "I cannot see how it's possible that we could leave this land before the end of the winter. But if after the winter people are determined that they will not have peace, that they want war, then we shall see."

The furious row between Mr. Butrus-Ghali and Gen. Cot erupted over the Frenchman's call for authority to summon Nato air power to protect troops under fire in Bosnia without having to seek time-consuming approvals from civilians in the UN hierarchy.

"The question of air support is rather the tip of the iceberg," said Gen. Cot. "I have asked for numerous reforms of the structure of the UN in Yugoslavia, especially in the use of information, the capacity to analyse and reflect, the use of supporting force."

Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, speaking after talks with French foreign minister Alain Juppe, reaffirmed that Washington would stand by its Nato commitment to use air strikes in Bosnia. But he emphasised that, despite urging from Paris, the United States would not put ground troops into Bosnia. [passage omitted]

Gives Prerequisites for Air Strikes

LD2401172494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1636 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 24 (TANJUG)—British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, who was sworn in a new commander of the U.N. force in Bosnia-Herzegovina on Monday, said air strikes would be mounted only in case of a massive attack on U.N. troops.

During the change-of-command ceremony at Sarajevo airport, Rose, who assumed duty from Belgian General Francis Briquemont, said in reply to a reporter's question whether he would oversee the withdrawal of U.N. troops in Bosnia that he had no such intentions at the moment, international news agencies and radio stations report.

The new U.N. commander in Bosnia said he would be continuing the mission carried out by his predecessor.

Rose also said it was too early to comment on Briquemont's complaint that the U.N. troops did not have the means to successfuly carry out their mission in Bosnia, torn by a civil war between local Moslems, Serbs and Croats for the past 22 months.

The commander of the U.N. Protection Force in former Yugoslavia, General Jean Cot of France, commended Briquemont for tireless service and handed him a medal for "exceptional performance" of his duties which was awarded to him by the U.N. secretary-general.

Briquemont, who took over as the U.N. Bosnia commander last July, resigned six months before his term was due to expire.

Cot's Comments Reported

LD2401190194 Paris Radio France International in French 1700 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] The UN Protection Forces in Bosnia have a new commander. He is British General Sir Michael Rose, who officially took over from Belgian General Francis Briquemont. There was an official handing-over ceremony at Sarajevo airport. General Jean Cot, the commander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, presided over the ceremony. Let us listen to him:

[Begin Cot recording] Since the first day of my mission here, on 1 July, and in full agreement with General Briquemont on the issues concerning him, I have asked for a certain number of things, particularly the appointment of a permanent special representative in Zagreb. He is there now, he is Mr. Akashi, and I am working with him. I asked for a delegate to the special representative to come to Sarajevo to work with General Briquemont. Sergio de Mello arrived here some months ago, and I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to thank him for his total cooperation with the military side. I have asked for many reforms of the UN structure in Yugoslavia, particularly concerning intelligence, analysis, and logistics. These reforms are underway. I achieved this with what I had, with my character. The [UN] secretary general made his decision, this is now over, I wish we would speak about something else. [end recording]

'Horrific Massacre' by Croats in Central Bosnia

LD2401215994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Dear listeners, we have just received a report on yet another crime committed by ustashas. Let us hear it:

[Reporter] Yet another in a series of Ustasha-perpetrated crimes against the Bosniak people will be recorded in the black chronicle of Tudjman's and Boban's fighters since having launched the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As of today, the black list of their massacres contains the heroic village of Here, situated on the free territory of the municipality of Prozor [central Bosnia]. This small but heroic village was razed to the ground today. It had been resisting the attacks of Boban's soldiery since October two years ago, when the ustashas occupied the larger part of the municipality of Prozor.

All day long the blackshirts [Croats] from Prozor were attacking the region of Here, and pulverized the vicinity with all kinds of artillery fire: multiple rocket launchers, tanks, howitzers, and mortar launchers. After that, using two battalions and a number of sabotage groups, the

ustashas raided the village, committing a horrific massacre on the village defenders and the unarmed civilian population, which included a large number of refugees. Defenders who had managed to persevere for 24 hours in the defense of the free territory and lives of the civilians did not manage to prevent the manslaughter, although they did not leave their positions until the last moment.

While we are reporting this, teams of military observers and UN representatives are travelling towards this village in order to see what the tragic aftermath of this crime is. [passage omitted]

The report was filed by the information service of the Sixth Corps [of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army].

HVO Claims Territorial Gains; Fighting Noted

LD2401200494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Heavy fighting is still going on in the area of Rama [Prozor] and Uskoplje [Gornji Vakuf]. It began early this morning with the Muslim Army's attacks from several directions. This afternoon the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] not only succeeded in defending its positions, but in a counterattack also took several elevations east of Prozor and conquered the village of Here, a Muslim stronghold from which all Muslim attacks in the area have been launched in the last few months.

Local HVO military sources report that the Muslim Army was completely routed in the fighting. The reports have still not been confirmed by the Political Department of the Defense Ministry of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. [passage omitted]

Croats Confirm Advances in Prozor, Vitez Areas

LD2501130494 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Report by correspondent Zdenko Vranjes]

[Excerpt] Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units captured several strategic positions and the Muslim stronghold of Here following strong clashes east of Prozor. This was confirmed at a news conference by the Herzeg-Bosna Ministry of Defense in Medjugorje today.

HVO spokesman Veso Vegar also told reporters that all the positions seized by the Muslim army in its pre-Christmas offensive in the Lasva valley have been retaken. [passage omitted]

Croatian Helicopter Attacks Muslim-Held Mostar

LD2401232594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Now a piece of news we have just received from our and the OLOBODJENJE correspondent, Alija Behran, which corresponds with what our reporter said earlier on. His report says that tonight, shortly after 1800, the Air Force of the Republic of Croatia attacked the very center of free Mostar.

Witnesses claim that one aircraft overflew the wider area of the Luka and Sahovine districts at a low altitude, dropping dozens of destructive bombs on roofs. The command of the 4th Corps of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has confirmed that Mostar has been bombarded from the air, but it says this was a Croatian Army helicopter flying from the direction of Metkovic. It eventually turned toward Siroki Brijeg under cover of darkness.

We have not yet managed to contact the war hospital, so we have not compiled the full casualty toll of tonight's bombardment of Mostar.

Army Destroys Tank at Brcko, Awaits Offensive

AU2501102294

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 25 January carries in its regular 10-minute newscast three reports on the current combat situation in the republic.

Zavidovici correspondent Viktor Boban reports from the Bosnia Operative Group Information Service that "there is no peace this morning in Zavidovici or the surrounding villages." He says that the enemy is using "80-mm and 120-mm mortars to pound Mimici and Hajdarovici indiscriminately, while the defenders of Dubravica and the town are being fired on by antiaircraft weapons. All the defense lines remain under the control of the 318th, 320th, and 309th Hill Brigades and other units of the Bosnia Operative Group."

An unidentified correspondent from the 3d Corps Press Center reports that "the joint chetnik-ustasha shelling of Zenica began this morning at around 0500 [0400 GMT]. A general alarm has been sounded. Several artillery shells have landed on the city. As I report this, the shelling is in progress. So far, we have no information about the consequences."

Brcko correspondent Hamid Deronjic reports that "there is no part of the Brcko defense on which the aggressor has not concentrated tanks and manpower. Everything points to the fact that the chetnik offensive at the Brcko free territory has yet to flare up. Just as I was about to file this report, I received information that the aggressor has launched a new infantry and tank attack on Vranovaca. The first wave of the attack has been thwarted. This morning at 0830, the troops of the 100th Motorized Brigade destroyed an enemy M-84 tank and killed 15 chetniks. Our defenders expect that the enemy infantry-tank will spread along the entire defense line of the 100th Motorized Brigade."

Silajdzic Addresses Interior Ministry Units

LD2401225394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Speech by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic at the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the inauguration of the Anti-terrorist Department on 24 January—recorded]

[Text] On behalf of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic addressed the gathering:

[Silajdzic] The government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you are our members, certainly relies to a great extent on the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and on this unit here, for the implementation of decisions. You are writing a special history of Sarajevo.

We are defending ourselves in a legal manner. This means that to whoever wants to allege, and this is what has been done in recent days, that we are opting for war in besieged Sarajevo. We are saying that when the siege of Sarajevo is lifted, when they finally understand that they cannot defeat Sarajevo, that they have to lift the siege, at that moment we shall certainly agree to peace.

We are receiving reports, gentlemen, that tanks are leaving Belgrade railway station and moving towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, it is being talked about us opting for war. Our option is peace. This is a legal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina; it is defending the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a legal manner.

Humanitarian Convoys Cross Serb Territory

LD2401191494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1749 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Zvornik, Jan 24 (TANJUG)—Humanitarian convoys of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) carrying aid for Moslem enclaves in war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina on Monday passed unhindered through Serb-held territory and safely reached their destinations, Bosnian Serb military sources report.

The 12-truck convoy for Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia was carryinv 100 tonnes of flour, sugar and canned beef, and six tonnes of plastic foil and nails. Eleven trucks with prefabricated elements for makeshift houses arrived at the same destination.

The convoy for the Moslem enclave of Tuzla in north-eastern Bosnia consisted of seven trucks carrying 70 tonnes of flour and two tanks loaded with 36 tonnes of heating fuel.

Humanitarian convoys pass unobstructed through the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic, which has been confirmed by both the U.N. peace-keepers and the UNHCR.

Silajdzic Addresses Government Session

AU2401164894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1436 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Speech by Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at a session of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo on 24 January—live]

[Text] Let us conclude once again: Since the beginning of the aggression, the humanitarian situation has never been more difficult. If the international community fails to ensure the passage of humanitarian convoys, with force if need be, an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe is awaiting Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are calling on those countries with humanitarian aid reserves to organize convoys and send them to Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as ensure the passage of humanitarian convoys through their activity in the United Nations and Security Council. The definition of the humanitarian problem must be extended to the shelling of civilian targets, that is, [words indistinct] (?besieged) Sarajevo and other towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we are calling on the United Nations Security Council to begin implementing its own resolutions.

Sarajevo was shelled again today. There is no reason for the United Nations, the Security Council, and the UNPROFOR on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina not to take measures articulated both by the Security Council resolutions and the communique, that is, the conclusions of NATO. Narrowing down the NATO conclusions to the opening of the Tuzla airport and the changeover in Srebrenica is only one more way of vindicating the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, providing the aggressor with an opportunity to once again avoid the deserved punishment. We repeat: The humanitarian situation applies not only to food; it applies to lives as well. We cannot feed the dead. Therefore, we are once more appealing to the United Nations to start implementing its own resolutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to do so at once. These are the conclusions of this extraordinary session of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thank you.

Martic Expected To Win Krajina Elections

AU2401201694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Report by Petko Koprivica from Krajina]

[Excerpt] The final outcome of the second round of presidential elections in the republic of Serbian Krajina is not known yet. However, all results so far indicate that independent candidate Milan Martic will assume the post of the head of this most westerly Serbian state. According to unofficial results, Milan Martic won 77,400 votes in 20 out of the total of 28 constituencies. The other presidential candidate, Milan Babic, received 72,130 votes. The Republican Electoral Commission holds the view that Martic's victory is a foregone conclusion. Here is what Marijana Puhaca, secretary of the aforementioned commission, said about the elections:

[Begin Puhaca recording] By 1400 today, the Republican Electoral Commission received unofficial results for 19 out of the total of 28 constituencies. These 19 constituencies have 199,274 registered voters. Of these, 140,334 or 58 percent have cast their vote. In these 19 constituencies, Milan Babic won 68,495 votes, and Milan Martic 71,527 votes.

By 1400 today, the Republican Electoral Commission received official results for only four communes, Drnis, Krnjak, Obrovac, and Plaski. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Wins in Slavonia, Baranja

AU2401160894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Report by Miladin Manojlovic]

[Text] According to unofficial results of yesterday's elections, Milan Martic has convincingly won the second round of elections for president of the republic of Serbian Krajina in Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Miladin Manojlovic reports from Beli Manastir:

[Manojlovic] In Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, Milan Martic won 7,070 votes more than Milan Babic. The Vukovar electoral unit voters, as in the first round of voting, supported Milan Martic the most. He received 15,715 votes and Milan Babic received 9,903 votes. Martic won with almost 6,000 votes more.

In other electoral units, the differences are not so great, only a few hundred votes more in favor of Martic, except in Dalj, where Milan Babic won. Milan Martic won in Beli Manastir, Mirkovci, and Tenja. Martic won 651 votes more in Beli Manastir, 271 votes more in Mirkovci, and 403 votes more in Tenja. Milan Babic won 66 votes more in Dalj.

The elections in this region went without any objections being raised. The results were verified by observers for both presidential candidates. A turnout of over 60 percent, despite bad weather, can be considered high and seen as an expression of the citizens' will, who confirmed once again the existence and resoluteness of the republic of Serbian Krajina.

Ammunition Seized From British Ship in Split

LD2401154894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Customs officers in the port of Split have prevented the illegal import of military equipment into the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The British warship Sir Geraint, anchored in the Split port on 21 January, and completed customs procedures in possession of valid documents. However, during the regular customs inspection, the customs officers discovered an irregularity—namely, one of the eight registered containers, declared as dangerous cargo, contained, instead of registered gas and petrol, a large amount of ammunition of various calibres, military equipment, hand grenades, and 43 boxes with 14 kg of explosives each.

As is the regular procedure according to Croatian regulations, which are in line with international laws, a commission will be formed to estimate the value of the illegal cargo. Criminal charges will be brought against the ship commander, while the illegally imported container, already been stored in the customs warehouse in Split, will be confiscated.

UK Spokeswoman Denies Involvement

LD2401194694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Lindsay French, spokeswoman for the British UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] units, told HINA [Croatian Press Agency] this afternoon that the British had no connection with and were not responsible for a case containing ammunition and weapons found today aboard the Sir Geraint by Split customs officials during their routine inspection of cargo transported on this ship from Trieste yesterday. This cargo belongs to the Nordic battalion. They hired our ship to transport cargo from Trieste to Split. This is also involves a mistake in paperwork. UNPROFOR has admitted to this mistake and apologized for it, said the spokeswoman for the British UN Command stationed in Divulje near Split.

Krajina Warns UN of Croatian Aggression

LD2401185094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1816 GMT 24 Jan 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 24 (TANJUG)—The foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.) Slobodan Jarcevic Monday [24 January] warned the U.N. Security Council that Croatia wishes to occupy the R.S.K. by military aggression and that it is striving to get the approval of the international communty to this end.

Jarcevic said that the R.S.K., republic proclaimed in 1991 by the Serbs in the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia where they are in majority, will defend its independence with determination. He underlined that the U.N. must help the just struggle of the R.S.K. and the right of its people to self-determination, guaranteed by the U.N. Charter.

Already in 1990, through terror and ethnic cleansing, Croatia caused the creation of two purely national states in the territory of the former Croatia : the Republic of Croatia and the R.S.K., Jarcevic said in a letter to the U.N. Security Council chairman. Jarcevic was reacting to a letter addressed on January 22 to the Security Council by Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, demanding that the international community help Croatia annex R.S.K. territory.

Croatia believes that the joint declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) and Croatia on the normalization of their relations gives it the green light to occupy the R.S.K., he said. Croatian President Tudjman Saturday warned that Croatia would recover the R.S.K. territory by other means if not through an agreement. The F.R.Y. has signed the declaration in order to normalize relations with the Republic of Croatia, and not to help Croatia annex the R.S.K. as the Croatian minister claimed in his letter, Jarcevic noted.

F.R.Y. and Croatian representatives signed on January 19 in Geneva a joint declaration on the normalization of their relations. Since the former Yugoslav Federation disintegrated, the two states have had no economic or political relations.

Federal

Problems in Introducing New Dinar Reported

LD2401124294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1146 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—The new dinar has not yet arrived in Montenegro, Todor Cicmil, director of the Treasury Department of the Montenegrin National Bank, told a TANJUG reporter this morning. According to him, the first delivery of the "super" dinar is expected during the day, in sufficient quantities for the pensions of about 70,000 Montenegrin pensioners. [passage omitted]

Mirko Paroski, the manager of the central post office in Novi Sad, has said that postmen could not distribute pensions to more than 15,000 pensioners today because the Financial Transaction Service has not yet sent out the new dinars. The service should have sent out 585,000 new dinars today and tomorrow. Consequently, Paroski says, the post office will only start delivering pensions tomorrow. [passage omitted]

The new dinars have not yet appeared in the busiest post office in Belgrade either, and the payment of pensions has been postponed until further notice, a TANJUG reporter was told today by Milan Radulovic, the manager of the Belgrade-3 post office. According to him, transactions in old dinars function as normal. [passage omitted]

The initial implementation of the federal government's new measures failed to meet the expectations in eastern Serbia too. This is the inevitable conclusion resulting from reports from commercial banks in Zajecar, Bor, Pozarevac, and Smederevo, which stress that this morning they could not pay part of January pensions due to a shortage of cash. [passage omitted]

Serbia

Assembly Fails To Elect President

LD2401213494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2057 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 24 (TANJUG)—Neither of the candidates nominated for the post of president of the parliament of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia was returned late on Monday evening [24 January]. The candidate of the Socialist Party, Zoran Arandjelovic, secured 123 votes, two short of the necessary majority. The candidate nominated jointly by the opposition, Gvozden Rosic, was supported by 118 deputies. The vote was taken by 249 deputies to the 250-seat parliament. The procedure will be repeated on Tuesday.

'Stalemate' Reported

AU2501132194 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] The Serbian Assembly will resume its discussion on the nomination of candidates for chairman of the assembly in half an hour. During the recess this morning, 119 deputies of the Socialist Party of Serbia again proposed Zoran Arandjelovic as chairman of the republican parliament, while 30 Depos [Democratic Movement of Serbia] deputies again proposed Gvozden Rosic. Some deputies have expressed the view that this is a stalemate situation. There is a possibility of neither of the two candidates being elected, as was the case last night. The Serbian Assembly is currently in recess. The session is scheduled to resume at 1430.

Hungarian Deputies To Abstain

LD2401195494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1656 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] At the first session of the new Serbian parliament, the 250 deputies, 123 of whom are from the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, are today expected to elect the parliament speaker. Before the vote, deputies discussed the candidates for the post of parliament speaker. "The leader of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [Demokratska Zajednica Vojvodjanskih Madjara—DZVM], Andras Agoston, said that the Hungarians should not tip the scales and added that it would be best if someone from the opposition were elected as parliament speaker, but that the five DZVM deputies would abstain in the vote in parliament, not only on this issue, but also when the new government is voted on."

Assembly Parties Form 'Club of Deputies'

LD2401211294 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1751 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Belgrade, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—A club of deputies of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia was set up in the Serbian Assembly today. The club of deputies has got 36 deputies: 29 of them belong to the Democratic Party, while seven belong to the Democratic Party of Serbia. The chairman of the club of deputies of the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia is Zoran Djindjic.

Macedonia

Government Passes Law on Denationalization

LD2401210194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2024 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Skopje, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—At its session today the government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia passed a law on denationalization, which is applicable to all property seized by the state without compensation between 2 August 1944 and 15 February

1968, it was announced in Skopje this evening. Implementation of the law will mean the return of property to the previous owners, which will take a long time, the Macedonian Government says. Among those dispossessed of their property are large numbers of the Serbian nationality, who were expelled from Macedonia in 1941 by the Bulgarian aggressor, and Josip Broz's [Tito's] regime banned their return to their homes. Most of the owners and their heirs are now citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and a number of them also live abroad.

Rift in Democratic Prosperity 'Grows Deeper'

AU2501074494 Skopje MIC in English 24 Jan 94

[Unattributed report: "Division in PDP Grows Deeper"]

[Text] Since two days ago, there are two parallel leaderships of the Tetovo branch of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity]. The first is led by Menduh Taci and the second is connected with the legal committee for the preparation of the congress of the party. The dilemma arises as to which leadership will be legal and present the body of the congress. It is interesting to note that the assembly under the leadership of Taci was attended by the representative of the Democratic Party of Albania, Saban Memia. Otherwise, representatives of both factions of the PDP stayed in Tirana, last week, on a "reconciliation" visit. However, the outcome in Tetovo, this weekend, shows that the "axe was not buried."

Polls Confirms Popularity of President Gligorov

AU2501074094 Skopje MIC in English 24 Jan 94

[Unattributed report: "Top 10 Macedonian Politicians"]

[Text] The agency for the research of pubic opinion BRI-MA, which cooperates with the renowned GALLUP, has conducted a research of the rating of the Macedonian politicians, in Macedonia. It was concluded that the list of the ten most trusted politicians is head by Kiro Gligorov with 70 percent. The second place belongs to Vasil Tupurkovski, who also notes a high rate of trust, with 50 percent of the people polled. The third position is occupied by the minister of the interior, Ljubomir Frckovski, with 50 percent, followed by Stojan Andov with 48 percent, and Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski with 46 percent of the votes. Sixth on the top-list is the minister of defense, Vlado Popovski, seventh Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski, eighth Petar Gosev, ninth Todor Petrov, and 10th Nikola Popovski.

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